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ABSTRACT 
Special-education litigation begins, under the terms of the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), with an “impartial due process” 
proceeding. States enjoy limited discretion to establish the manner by which 
they will effectuate this process. Variations in implementation exist. Most 
states offer a “single-tiered” process, and eight offer a “two-tiered” proceeding. 
National debate about the effectiveness of these administrative 
proceedings has increased over the last decade. One contested question is 
whether a single-tiered or two-tiered administrative process better serves the 
objectives of the Act. 
Meaningful empirical examination of these specialized proceedings has 
begun to inform this debate, but significant research gaps remain. No 
quantitative study of these processes exists for many states’ systems, including 
for North Carolina’s, a system with a unique two-tiered process. This Article 
begins to fill this research void. 
It offers an empirical evaluation of first-tier decisions issued over a 12-
year period in North Carolina’s special-education due-process proceedings. It 
identifies statistically significant due-process implementation and outcome 
trends. It also evaluates the impact of factors intuitively believed to matter in 
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these cases. Examples of variables considered include the availability of pre-
hearing mediation, changes in relevant statutory standards, type of disability 
accommodated, age of the child at issue, type of school, setting in which the 
dispute arose (rural or urban), and petitioners’ representation status. 
This analysis debunks some popular conceptions about these unique 
administrative proceedings, and it affirms the validity of others. It identifies 
one variable, legal representation during the first-tier review, as most 
significantly correlated with favorable outcomes for children with disabilities at 
this stage of litigation. Ultimately, it contributes new empirical data to the 
national conversation about outcomes of first-tier hearings in two-tiered due-
process procedures under the IDEA. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, North Carolina’s general statutes declare: “The goal of the State 
is to provide full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities who 
reside in the State.”1 As recently as 40 years ago, the opposite was true. 
In 1965 the North Carolina General Assembly passed legislation to 
prevent children with disabilities from attending public schools.2 This 
legislation fulfilled its objective in two ways: it codified the then-prominent 
practice to exclude children with “severe” disabilities from public schools, and 
it criminalized parents’ efforts to enroll these children over school-system 
decisions to exclude them.3 
The 1965 statute announced: “A child so severely afflicted by mental, 
emotional, or physical incapacity as to make it impossible for such a child to 
profit by instruction given in the public schools shall not be permitted to attend 
the public schools of the State.”4 
It then established: “If the parent or guardian of such a child persists in 
forcing his attendance after such a report has determined that the child should 
1  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.1 (2015); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(2) (2013) (providing 
in federal law that states receiving funding under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
must “establish[] a goal of providing full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities 
and a detailed timetable for accomplishing that goal”). 
2  1965 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 584, § 17, http://www.ncleg.net/enactedlegislation/sessionlaws 
/html/1965-1966/ sl1965-584.html. 
3  See Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A 
Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 355–56 (1990) 
(summarizing legislative, administrative, and judicial activity from the late 1800s through the 
1960s that either required or permitted the exclusion of children with disabilities from public 
schools). 
4  1965 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 584, § 17 (emphasis added), http://www.ncleg.net/enactedlegis 
lation/sessionlaws/html/1965-1966/sl1965-584.html. 
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not attend the public schools, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon 
conviction shall be punished at the discretion of the court.”5 
Momentum to change this reality gradually grew nationally and within 
North Carolina in the 1970s. Notably, in 1972, two federal district courts 
declared unconstitutional the wholesale exclusion of children with disabilities 
from public schools without due process or a rational reason.6 They also 
introduced the affirmative principle that “[e]very retarded person between the 
ages of six and twenty-one years [shall be provided] access to a free public 
program of education and training appropriate to his learning capacities.”7 
In 1974, shortly after issuance of these federal district court decisions 
and as Congress hammered out the details of the then-forthcoming Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA), the North Carolina General 
Assembly again took action on education for children with disabilities. It 
repealed North Carolina’s exclusionary and punitive 1965 statute and 
recognized that “no child . . . shall be excluded from service or education for 
any reason whatsoever.”8 
In 1975, the EHA, the first iteration of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, became law.9 At this time, the legacy of state statutes, like 
North Carolina’s 1965 statute, remained prevalent. In fact, 
5  Id. (emphasis added). 
6  See Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 294–95, 297 (E.D. 
Pa. 1972) (entering a consent order resolving plaintiffs’ claims that exclusion of children with 
disabilities from public schools offends constitutional principles of due process and equal 
protection and requiring that “[e]very retarded person between the ages of six and twenty-one 
years [shall be provided] access to a free public program of education and training appropriate to 
his learning capacities” by the state); see also Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 
(D.D.C. 1972) (concluding that public schools may not exclude students merely because they 
have been labeled as behaviorally problematic, mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, or 
hyperactive because “[d]efendants are required by the Constitution of the United States . . . to 
provide a publicly-supported education for these ‘exceptional’ children” and “[f]ailure to fulfill 
this clear duty to include and retain these children in the public school system . . . cannot be 
excused”). 
7  Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children, 343 F. Supp. at 303. The language used to identify 
children with disabilities has changed significantly over time. This Article retains original 
language in quoted text, but it otherwise attempts to use modern terminology. Today, “person 
first” language is standard. The United States Supreme Court even recognized recently that 
“mental retardation” is an outdated characterization of a person with an intellectual disability and 
that it would not use that outdated term in its current opinions. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 
1986, 1990 (2014) (“Previous opinions of this Court have employed the term ‘mental 
retardation.’ This opinion uses the term ‘intellectual disability’ to describe the identical 
phenomenon.”). 
8  1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1293, § 2, http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/Session 
Laws/HTML/1973-1974/SL1973-1293.html (codifying “An Act to Establish Equal Educational 
Opportunities in the Public Schools; and For Other Purposes,” effective July 1, 1974). 
9  Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1491 (2011)). 
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congressional studies [at the time] revealed that better than half 
of the Nation’s 8 million disabled children were not receiving 
appropriate educational services. Indeed, one out of every eight 
of these children was excluded from the public school system 
altogether, many others were simply “warehoused” in special 
classes or were neglectfully shepherded through the system 
until they were old enough to drop out.10 
The EHA affirmatively addressed the oppressive objectives of North 
Carolina’s 1965 statute and others like it across the country. This landmark 
legislation established substantive and procedural rights in favor of children 
with disabilities and their parents. 
Substantively, the EHA codified the right of children with disabilities 
to receive a free appropriate public education (FAPE).11 This ended any notion, 
like that reflected in North Carolina’s former 1965 legislation, that such 
children “shall not be permitted to attend public schools.”12 
Procedurally, the EHA provided parents with extensive notice and “due 
process” rights, empowering them to participate in their children’s education 
and to enforce the rights established by the Act.13 This ended the notion, 
previously codified in North Carolina’s 1965 legislation, that parental 
participation in the education of their children with disabilities was criminal 
and appropriate for punishment. 
Congress has revisited the terms of this landmark legislation, now 
renamed and known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA),14 multiple times since its original passage.15 In each reauthorization, it 
10  Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 596–97 (1988). 
11  See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2013) (establishing as one purpose for the Act “to 
ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public 
education”); id. § 1401(9) (defining a “free appropriate public education” for purposes of the 
Act); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17 (2015) (detailing the meaning of a “free appropriate public education”); 
id. §§ 300.101–.113 (specifying the requirements that states must satisfy in order to be compliant 
with their obligation to provide a free appropriate public education to eligible children with 
disabilities under the IDEA). 
12  1965 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 584, § 17, http://www.ncleg.net/enactedlegislation/sessionlaws/ 
html/1965-1966/ sl1965-584.html. 
13  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (making clear that states “shall establish and maintain 
procedures . . . to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed 
procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education”); see 
also id. § 1415(b)–(o) (detailing the procedural protections required by the IDEA); 34 C.F.R. §§ 
300.501, 300.516 (same). 
14  Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 
1103 (1990) (re-naming the legislation the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act). It 
warrants noting that the 2004 revisions to the IDEA characterized the reauthorized legislation as 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA). See Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) 
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1491 (2009)). As a result, some now refer to this legislation as 
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has retained or strengthened the Act’s fundamental goal to improve educational 
outcomes for children with disabilities through substantive and procedural 
protections for those children and their parents.16 
Today, children’s rights to attend public schools, regardless of their 
abilities, and parents’ rights to participate in their children’s education are well 
established in federal17 and state law.18 
This Article focuses on one of the fundamental procedural rights 
guaranteed by the IDEA: the right to an “impartial due process hearing.” Both 
federal and state law now guarantee children with disabilities and their 
parents19 a right to an administrative “impartial due process hearing,”20 
conducted expeditiously, through which they may challenge “any matter 
relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, 
or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child,”21 or the 
discipline of such child.22 
IDEIA or the 2004 Reauthorization. For purposes of this Article, it will be referred to as the 
IDEA, the acronym established for this legislation in 1990 with the passage of the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1990. 
15  See Lisa Lukasik, Asperger’s Syndrome and Eligibility Under the IDEA: Eliminating the 
Emerging “Failure First” Requirement to Prevent a Good IDEA from Going Bad, 19 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 252, 259–62 (2011) (detailing this legislative development). 
16  See id. at 260–61. 
17  See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (identifying the purposes of the federal legislation as, inter 
alia, “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public 
education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique 
needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living”; “to ensure 
that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected”; and “to 
assist States, localities, and educational service agencies, and Federal agencies to provide for the 
education of all children with disabilities”). 
18  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.2(a) (2015) (“The purposes of this Article are to (i) 
ensure that all children with disabilities ages three through 21 who reside in this State have 
available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and 
related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepares them for further education, 
employment, and independent living; (ii) ensure that the rights of these children and their parents 
are protected; and (iii) enable the State Board of Education and local agencies to provide for the 
education of all children with disabilities.”). 
19  Parents may enjoy this right only until their child with a disability reaches a state’s age of 
majority unless the parent secures legal guardianship of a child who has been determined to be 
incompetent or has been appropriately appointed to represent the educational interests of the 
child under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.2. 
20  20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (guaranteeing that “[w]henever a complaint has been received 
under subsection (b)(6) or (k), the parents or the local educational agency involved in such 
complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing”); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-109.6 (guaranteeing that “[a]ny party may file with the Office of Administrative 
Hearings a petition to request an impartial hearing”). 
21  20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (identifying the substance upon which parties may file a 
complaint leading to an “impartial due process hearing”); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-
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In recent years, scrutiny of this procedural right has increased.23 
Academics have begun to compile data from a handful of states to develop an 
empirical foundation upon which to build a meaningful dialogue regarding its 
strengths and weaknesses.24 To date, however, there has been no empirical 
109.6(a) (identifying the substance upon which parties may file a petition for an “impartial 
hearing” in North Carolina). 
22  20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(H), (k)(3) (guaranteeing that the procedural rights afforded to 
children with disabilities and their parents extend to situations in which a child with a disability is 
removed from his public educational placement as part of school discipline); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-109.6(a) (including “manifestation determinations” done in connection with 
decisions regarding the discipline of a child with disabilities within the list of matters available 
for “impartial due process hearings”). 
23  See, e.g., Jasmine E. Harris, Processing Disability, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 459–60 (2015) 
(examining the consequences of the legal practice to hold private, rather than public, adjudicatory 
proceedings in matters involving the rights of persons with disabilities and considering special-
education due-process proceedings as an illustrative example); Eloise Pasachoff, Special 
Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1414 
(2011) (arguing that the private enforcement mechanism in the IDEA leads to “predictable 
disparities in enforcement in favor of wealthier beneficiaries as opposed to poor beneficiaries”); 
Geoffrey F. Schultz & Joseph R. McKinney, Special Education Due Process: Hearing Officer 
Background and Case Variable Effects on Decisions Outcomes, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 17, 17 
(reviewing the effect of hearing officer background on case outcomes); Mark C. Weber, In 
Defense of IDEA Due Process, 29 OHIO ST. J. DISP. ON RESOL. 459, 523 (2014) (acknowledging 
the national debate about due-process proceedings, defending them, and identifying meaningful 
modifications to improve the process overall); Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for 
Denials of FAPE Under the IDEA, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 214, 221 (2013) 
(examining decisions published in Special Ed Connection to identify the frequency of particular 
outcomes achieved through the IDEA’s administrative process in cases establishing a violation of 
FAPE); Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems Under the IDEA: A State-
by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3, 3–8 (2010) (offering an overview of the types 
of due-process systems employed across the country and how those systems are operated). 
24  See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 137–216 (N.Y. Press 2013) (considering outcomes in Ohio, 
Florida, New Jersey, California, and the District of Columbia); Ruth Colker, Special Education 
Complaint Resolution: Ohio, 29 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 371, 371–74 (2014) (identifying 
outcomes in Ohio’s special-education complaint proceedings and comparing them to outcomes in 
that state’s due-process proceedings); Perry A. Zirkel, Special Education Hearing Officers: 
Balance and Bias, 24 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 67 (2013) (identifying outcomes of a five-state 
study of administrative decisions in special-education cases in California, Connecticut, Florida, 
Massachusetts, and New Jersey); Perry A. Zirkel, Judicial Appeals for Hearing/Review Officer 
Decisions Under IDEA: An Empirical Analysis, 78 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 375, 379 (2012) 
(analyzing 65 hearing officer decisions issued between 1982 and 2010 to identify outcome 
trends); Cali Cope-Kasten, Note, Bidding (Fair)Well to Due Process: The Need for a Fairer 
Final State in Special Education Dispute Resolution, 42 J.L. & EDUC. 501, 522 (2013) (offering 
data on this process in Wisconsin and Minnesota); MELANIE ARCHER, ACCESS AND EQUITY IN THE
DUE PROCESS SYSTEM: ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND HEARING OUTCOMES IN ILLINOIS, 1997–
2002, at 7 (2002), http://dueprocessillinois.org/Access.pdf (identifying outcomes in Illinois). 
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analysis of these statutorily guaranteed administrative “impartial due process 
hearings” in North Carolina. This Article begins that study.25 
It examines administrative law judge (ALJ) decisions in North 
Carolina’s “first-tier” impartial due-process hearings. This Article draws its 
data from the complete, available body of North Carolina ALJ decisions 
resolving special-education complaints filed between January 2000 and 
December 2012.26 
In Part II, this Article provides background on North Carolina’s unique 
implementation of the federal obligation to provide administrative “impartial 
due process hearings.” It also explains the source of and limitations on the body 
of ALJ decisions considered along with the methodology used to analyze those 
decisions. 
Part III presents foundational data drawn from an analysis of 12 years 
of written ALJ decisions following due-process hearings in North Carolina’s 
special-education cases. It considers several widely debated changes in the law 
to measure their impact, if any, on outcomes in these hearings. Some of the 
statistical data uncovered refutes intuitive conceptions about how judicial 
decisions and legislative changes in the law influence outcomes at this stage. 
Part IV compiles and presents data beyond the foundation introduced in 
Part III. It reports what actually happened, historically, in these hearings, 
eliminating the need to rely on anecdotal evidence in discussions about the 
effectiveness of this process. The data presented here includes statistics 
addressing, for example, which party most often initiated those proceedings, 
whether they were initiated more frequently in urban or rural counties, whether 
the parties were pro se or represented by legal counsel, and how frequently 
petitioners found success overall and under specified circumstances.27 
Finally, this Article concludes by recognizing that additional research 
remains to be done to build on the initial empirical results presented here. 
25  North Carolina has a two-tiered impartial administrative process. This Article publishes 
data on the first tier of these proceedings. An article offering an empirical analysis of the second 
tier is in progress. 
26  See infra notes 47–61 and accompanying text (explaining how the Author obtained the 
ALJ decisions considered through public records requests and acknowledging the possibility that 
gaps exist). 
27  See infra Part IV. Success (or failure) in the first-tier proceedings examined in this study 
does not equate to success (or failure) at large. The decisions examined here may be appealed to 
an administrative review office (for the second-tier review) before being appealed further to 
federal or state court. First-tier decisions may be overturned at any subsequent step in the 
process. A prevailing party at the first tier may end up “losing” on appeal. A failing party at the 
first tier may find “success” on appeal. 
2015] SPECIAL-EDUCATION LITIGATION 743 
As a State Hearing Review Officer,28 the Author does not advocate for 
any particular normative understanding of North Carolina’s first-tier hearing 
procedure or the IDEA generally based upon the statistical analysis provided.29 
Instead, the Author and this Article simply contribute by providing previously 
unavailable and unexamined descriptive data. 
This Article does, however, reach two irrefutable conclusions. First, 
North Carolina’s first-tier “informal due process hearing” procedure represents 
progress. It embodies a complete reversal from the state’s criminal treatment of 
parental involvement in the education of their children with disabilities 40 
years ago. Further, parents’ representation by an attorney stands out among all 
factors analyzed, including factors associated with specific changes in the law, 
as the one correlating most significantly with positive parental outcomes in 
first-tier special-education hearings.30 
II. NORTH CAROLINA’S SPECIAL-EDUCATION LITIGATION: BACKGROUND
AND BEGINNINGS 
Before reporting the statistical data derived from this study of North 
Carolina’s first-tier decisions in special-education litigation, this Article 
presents necessary background. This Part offers an overview of the federal and 
state law governing the structure of the hearings. It then explains the 
methodology used to collect and evaluate the decisions examined. 
A. Background on North Carolina’s Unique Two-Tiered Administrative 
Process 
The IDEA requires states to provide an expeditious administrative 
review of complaints regarding the education of children with disabilities. But 
it allows states some flexibility in determining how to satisfy that obligation. 
28  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.9 (2015) (authorizing State Hearing Review Officers and 
explaining their role in resolving due-process complaints in second-tier administrative hearings 
on appeal following issuance of written tier-one decisions, like those considered in this Article). 
29  To be clear, the data presented here may provoke particular ponderings about the 
effectiveness of existing laws protecting the relatively newly recognized right of children with 
disabilities to access free appropriate public education. This Article specifically does not suggest 
or encourage any particular resolution to such ideas. Instead, the purpose of this publication is 
simpler. It seeks only to open a window to previously shuttered factual data about North 
Carolina’s special-education litigation at its inception and in its early administrative stages. 
30  See infra Part IV.A.3 (offering the data on the correlation between parental representation 
and hearing outcomes). Because school systems (both traditional and charter) were represented 
by attorneys in all tier-one hearings considered in this analysis, this data pool offered no control 
group without representation against which to compare school-system outcomes based upon the 
representation variable. 
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North Carolina employs a unique, but permissible,31 means to satisfy the 
federal requirement for “impartial due process hearings” in this context. 
The IDEA guarantees parents and school systems access to “an 
impartial due process hearing” to resolve disputes over the identification and 
evaluation of children with disabilities and the provision of FAPE.32 The IDEA 
further provides that these impartial due-process hearings “shall be conducted 
[1] by the State educational agency or [2] by the local educational agency, as 
determined by State law.”33 Participation in the state’s selected due-process 
hearing procedure begins litigation in special-education disputes. 
Depending upon whether a state opts to conduct its initial 
administrative review through a local educational agency or the state 
educational agency, the IDEA may impose additional requirements on the 
process. 
If a state opts to authorize “the local educational agency to conduct the 
[initial] due process hearing, [the state] must provide” an opportunity for parties 
to appeal that decision to the state educational agency.34 On the other hand, if 
the state educational agency conducts the initial due-process proceeding, no 
administrative appeal is required.35 
The former structure, in which special-education litigation begins with 
a hearing before a local educational agency followed by an administrative 
appeal to a state educational agency, is often referred to as a “two-tiered 
system.” This is because, in the usual case, it requires a “second-tier” 
administrative review before the state board of education. 
The latter structure, in which special education begins in a hearing 
before the state board of education, is commonly characterized as a “single-
31  See E.L. ex rel. Lorsson v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 773 F.3d 509, 515–16 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (holding that North Carolina’s two-tiered administrative process is permissible under 
the IDEA); O.M. ex rel. McWhirter v. Orange Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:09-CV-692, 2013 WL 
664900, at *11 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 22, 2013) (concluding that North Carolina’s two-tiered 
administrative process is permissible under the IDEA); L.K. ex rel. Henderson v. N.C. State Bd. 
of Educ., No. 5:08-CV-85-BR, 2010 WL 3239091, at *6 (E.D.N.C. June 23, 2010) (noting that 
correspondence from the United States Office of Special Educational Programs indicates that the 
federal Department of Education participated in the development of North Carolina’s two-tiered 
administrative process and approved of it). 
32  20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2013); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(a) (2015). 
33  20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(b) (providing 
also that the impartial due-process hearing required by the Act “must be conducted by the SEA 
[State Educational Agency] or the public agency directly responsible for the education of the 
child, as determined under State statute, State regulation, or a written policy of the SEA”). 
34  Wittenberg v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:05CV00818, 2006 WL 
2568937, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2006) (emphases added); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1). 
35  20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) (remaining silent regarding any administrative appeal required in 
states whose state boards of education conduct the initial due-process hearing); see also 
Wittenberg, 2006 WL 2568937, at *2 (“If the state elects to allow the local educational agency to 
conduct the due process hearing, it must provide for an appeal to the state educational agency.”). 
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tiered system.” This is because it requires no federally mandated “second-tier” 
administrative review. 
Most jurisdictions employ the single-tiered system.36 In fact, 42 states, 
plus the District of Columbia, employ a single-tiered administrative process.37 
Only eight states require a two-tiered administrative process.38 Of the 
eight states with a two-tiered process, not all operate like North Carolina, where 
both the initial hearing and the administrative review are before state officers.39 
36  See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-8-9.08 (2015); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550 
(2015); ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R7-2-405 (2015); ARK. CODE R. § 005.18.31-4 (LexisNexis 2015); 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 60550 (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-20-108 (2015); CONN. AGENCIES
REGS. § 10-76h-16 (2015); 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 926 (2015); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5-E, § 3031 
(2015); FLA. STAT. § 1003.57 (2015); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-4-7.12 (2015); HAW. CODE R. § 
8-60-68 (LexisNexis 2015); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 08.02.03.109 (2015); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5 / 14-8.02a (2015); 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-45-9 (2015); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-
41.514 (2015); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, pt. XLIII, § 514 (2015); 05-071, Ch. 101 ME. CODE R. § 
XVI (LexisNexis 2015); MD. CODE REGS. 13A.05.01.15 (2015); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 28.08 
(2015); MICH. ADMIN. Code r. 340.1724f (2015); MINN. R. 3525.4770 (2015); 7-4 MISS. CODE R. 
§ 1:300.514 (LexisNexis 2015); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 5, § 20-300.110 (2015); MONT.
ADMIN. R. 10.16.3523 (2015); 92 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 55-009 (2015); N.H. CODE R. EDUC. 
1123.20 (2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §1:6A-18.3 (2015); N.M. CODE R. § 6.31.2 (LexisNexis 
2015); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 67-23-05-01 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 343.175 (2015); 22 PA. CODE § 
16.63 (2015); 21-2-54:E R.I. CODE R. § 300.514 (LexisNexis 2015); S.D. ADMIN. R. 24:05:30:11 
(2015); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0520-01-09-.19 (2015); 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1185 
(2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-15-305 (LexisNexis 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2957 (West 
2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-214 (2015); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-172A-05115 (2015); W.
VA. CODE R. § 126-16-11.4 (2015); WIS. STAT. § 115.80 (2015); 7 WYO. CODE R. § 7 
(LexisNexis 2015); see also Weber, supra note 23, at 513 (noting a “trend in the states away 
from two-tier (hearing and decision and then review officer proceeding) system to one-tier 
processes”). 
37  See supra note 36 (offering citations to all 43 statutes providing single-tier due-process 
review proceedings in special-education cases); see also Larson v. Int’l Falls Pub. Sch., No. Civ. 
02-3611, 2002 WL 31108199, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2002) (“[T]he Court notes that the notion 
that the [Minnesota] IHO level of review is local is a legal fiction.”); Wittenberg, 2006 WL 
2568937, at *4 n.4. But see T.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 55 F. Supp. 2d 830, 845 (N.D. Ill. 1999) 
(“[T]he text of the Illinois statute which governed IDEA proceedings at the time of [the child’s] 
IEP reveals that both the Level I and Level II hearings are ‘state level’ hearings.”). 
38  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-974(b)(1)–(b)(1)(A) (2015) (“Any party to a due process 
hearing provided for under this act may appeal the decision to the state board by filing a written 
notice of appeal . . . . A review officer appointed by the state board shall conduct an impartial 
review of the decision.”); 707 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:340.12(1) (2015) (“A party to a due process 
hearing that is aggrieved by the hearing decision may appeal the decision to members of the 
Exceptional Children Appeals Board as assigned by the Kentucky Department of Education.”); 
NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 388.315 (2015) (“A party may appeal from the decision of a hearing 
officer . . . [and] a state review officer appointed by the Superintendent from a list of officers 
maintained by the Department shall conduct an impartial review of the hearing.”); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 4404(1)(c) (McKinney 2015) (“The decision of the impartial hearing officer shall be 
binding upon both parties unless appealed to the state review officer.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-
109.9(a) (2015) (“Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision of a hearing officer . . . may 
appeal the findings . . . . The State Board, through the Exceptional Children Division, shall 
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The two-tiered system in North Carolina is unique because both tiers of 
administrative review are before a state, not local, authority. North Carolina 
does not authorize a local educational agency to render an initial decision. 
Instead, it authorizes the Office of Administrative Hearings40 to deploy a state-
employed, specially trained41 administrative law judge (ALJ) to the county in 
which the dispute arose to resolve the first-tier hearing.42 Then, it requires 
parties to appeal adverse ALJ decisions to a review officer appointed by the 
state board of education43 before filing further appeal in federal or state court.44 
appoint a Review Officer from a pool of review officers . . . [who] shall conduct an impartial 
review . . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.05(3)(h) (LexisNexis 2015) (“A party to a 
hearing . . . shall be accorded . . . [a]n opportunity . . . to appeal . . . to the state board, which shall 
appoint a state level officer who shall review the case and issue a final order.”); OKLA. ADMIN.
CODE § 210:15-13-5(a) (2015) (“All Hearing and Appeal Officers assigned by the Oklahoma 
State Department of Education . . . are expected to remain impartial in discharging their 
responsibilities at all times.”); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-243(15)(b)(1) (2015) (“If the hearing 
required by Sec. 300.511 is conducted by a public agency other than the SEA, any party 
aggrieved by the findings and decision in the hearing may appeal to the SEA. If there is an 
appeal, the SEA must conduct an impartial review . . . .”). 
39  See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-243(15)(b)(1) (“If the hearing required by Sec. 
300.511 is conducted by a public agency other than the SEA, any party aggrieved by the findings 
and decision in the hearing may appeal to the SEA. If there is an appeal, the SEA must conduct 
an impartial review . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
40  “The Office of Administrative Hearings is an independent, quasi-judicial agency under 
Article III, Sec. 11 of the [North Carolina] Constitution . . . .” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750. Parties 
initiating due-process proceedings in special-education litigation do so by filing a petition with 
the Office of Administrative Hearings. § 115C-109.6. 
41  See Memorandum of Understanding from the N.C. State Bd. of Educ., through the Dep’t 
of Pub. Instruction, Exceptional Children Div. to the N.C. Office of Admin. Hearings, at 3 (Nov. 
27, 2006) (on file with the West Virginia Law Review). This Memorandum of Understanding 
requires the Department of Public Instruction (DPI) to “provide and pay tuition and costs for 
IDEA training to special education ALJs [administrative law judges] designated by the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge.” Id. It further requires that the “DPI will review with the Chief ALJ, 
on a yearly basis, the ongoing special education training needs of ALJs. ALJs hearing special 
education cases will be required to participate annually in IDEA training updates and are strongly 
encouraged to attend [other trainings].” Id. The Office of Administrative Hearings “will not 
appoint temporary ALJs,” who have not been specially trained, “to conduct special education 
hearings.” Id. at 4. 
42  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.6. 
43  See id. § 115C-109.9(a)–(b). Although typically decisions of ALJs are not appealed in this 
manner, the state administrative procedures act in Chapter 150B makes clear that appeal rights 
provided within it do not apply to special-education litigation. Chapter 150B provides that 
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, timelines and other procedural safeguards 
required to be provided under IDEA and Article 9 of Chapter 115C of the General Statutes must 
be followed in an impartial due process hearing initiated when a petition is filed under G.S. 
115C-109.6 with the Office of Administrative Hearings.” Id. § 150B-22.1(a) (emphasis added). 
In other words, the only appeals process for first-tier ALJ decisions in North Carolina’s special-
education disputes is the one established by Chapter 115C and particular to special-education 
litigation. 
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As the Federal District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina 
summarized, 
North Carolina has a two-tiered administrative process. At the 
first tier, “any party may file with the Office of Administrative 
Hearings [(‘OAH’)] a petition to request an impartial hearing 
with respect to any matter relating to the provision of a [FAPE] 
of a child[.]” The OAH then selects an Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”) who [conducts the hearing “in the county where 
the child attends school or is entitled to enroll in school . . . 
unless the parties mutually agree” otherwise . . . and] “issue[s] 
a written decision[.]” At the second tier, “[a]ny party aggrieved 
by the findings and decision of a hearing officer . . . may 
appeal . . . by filing a written notice of appeal with the person 
designated by the State Board.” At that point, “[t]he State 
Board . . . appoint[s] a Review Officer [(“SRO”) to] . . . 
conduct an impartial review of the findings and decision 
appealed . . . [and] make an independent decision upon 
completion of the review.”45 
Once the State Review Officer renders a decision, under both federal 
and North Carolina law, either party to the dispute may institute a civil action 
44  See id. § 115C-109.9(d). Interestingly, not all decisions studied in this research accurately 
reflect this administrative process. Some ALJ decisions incorrectly state that parties may appeal 
these decisions either to superior court pursuant to Article 4 of Chapter 150B, the judicial review 
procedures of North Carolina’s Administrative Procedure Act, or in federal court under the 
IDEA. Other ALJ decisions reflect the law that parties may appeal these decisions by filing 
notice of appeal with the State Board of Education under Article 9 of Chapter 115C, North 
Carolina’s legislation on the education of children with disabilities. 
45  O.M. ex rel. McWhirter v. Orange Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1: 09-CV-692, 2013 WL 
664900, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 22, 2013) (some alterations in original) (internal citations 
omitted); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(1)–(2) (2013) (requiring the procedural safeguards notice 
and detailing its contents and distribution); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504 (2015) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 115C-109.1 (“The State Board of Education shall make available to parents a handbook of
procedural safeguards. This handbook for parents shall be made available at least once each 
school year, except that a copy also shall be given to a parent [upon initial referral, parental 
request, or other significant moments in the special-education process, and] ‘shall include a full 
explanation’ [of key special-education rights and procedural requirements]. . . . The State Board 
shall place a current copy of the handbook for parents on its Internet Web site.”); PUB. SCHS. OF 
N.C., PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS: HANDBOOK ON PARENTS’ RIGHTS 18 (2009), http://ec.ncpublic 
schools.gov/parent-resources/ecparenthandbook.pdf (“A decision made in a due process 
hearing . . . is final, unless appealed. Either party involved in the hearing (you [parent] or the 
LEA [local educational agency]) may appeal the decision to the EC [Exceptional Children] 
Division within 30 days of receipt of the decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings. In 
other words . . . [i]f you [parent] disagree with the judge’s decision in a due process hearing, you 
may appeal it to the EC Division within 30 days of receiving the decision.”). 
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in federal or state court.46 This civil action then proceeds as any other civil 
action instituted in federal or state court. Only a minority of cases, however, are 
litigated beyond North Carolina’s administrative two-tiered due-process 
procedure. 
The analysis presented here addresses written ALJ decisions issued 
following the first-tier due-process hearings in those cases in which complaints 
were initiated between January 2000 and December 2012. 
B. Explanation of Decision Acquisition, Study Methodology, and Inherent 
Limitations on the Analysis 
The statistical data offered in this Article derives from an analysis of 97 
North Carolina ALJ decisions resolving special-education due-process 
complaints filed in the years 2000 through 2012. These decisions comprise all 
North Carolina tier-one decisions over the covered period available in print or 
electronic resources or via public records requests.47 
46  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2013) (establishing the right to “bring a civil action . . . in 
any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, without regard 
to the amount in controversy” once the administrative process has run its course); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-109.9(d) (identifying a right to appeal “the decision of the Review Officer” in a 
civil action in state or federal court). 
47  The Author believes she has collected all written ALJ decisions publicly available. She 
has everything available in print or through electronic resources, and she has all she can acquire 
via records requests from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (DPI). On March 
11, 2013, Ms. Lynn Smith, Dispute Resolution Consultant with the North Carolina Department 
of Public Instruction, indicated that the materials she had provided were “close to covering the 
cases” in our request, but that she still needed to provide “review decisions and would like to 
send . . . the federal case numbers.” E-mail from Lynn Smith, Dispute Resolution Consultant, 
Exceptional Children Div., N.C. Dep’t of Public Instruction, to Lisa Lukasik, Assistant Professor 
of Law, Campbell Law (Mar. 11, 2013, 17:10 EST) (on file with the West Virginia Law Review) 
(suggesting that all first-tier decisions had been provided and that only second-tier, review officer 
decisions remained outstanding). On March 25, 2013, Ms. Smith delivered what she believed to 
be the final batch of “review officer decisions” or second-tier decisions, and wrote that “[t]o the 
best of my knowledge, this is all the decisions.” E-mail from Lynn Smith, Dispute Resolution 
Consultant, Exceptional Children Div., N.C. Dep’t of Public Instruction, to Lisa Lukasik, 
Assistant Professor of Law, Campbell Law (Mar. 25, 2013, 19:01 EST) (on file with the West 
Virginia Law Review). At that time, the Author believed she had received all first and second-tier 
decisions over the covered period. As she reviewed the decisions, however, she identified a 
handful of cases that she believed were missing. She presented those case numbers at 
conferences in 2014 and early 2015, where school-system administrators, parents of children 
with disabilities, and school attorneys were present, seeking information from outside the 
Department of Public Instruction to locate the “missing” decisions. Because Lynn Smith retired 
in October 2013, the Author also corresponded with Mr. Bill Elvey, another Consultant with the 
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. On April 3, 2014, Mr. Elvey indicated that he 
could not find the first-tier decisions the Author identified as missing from her collection, but he 
found one review officer decision with a citation to one of the missing first-tier decisions. E-mail 
from Bill Elvey, Dispute Resolution Consultant, Exceptional Children Div., N.C. Dep’t of Pub. 
Instruction, to Lisa Lukasik, Assistant Professor of Law, Campbell Law (Apr. 3, 2014 13:05 
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This section of the Article highlights the federal and state laws 
requiring ALJ decisions in special-education due-process proceedings to be 
made available to the public. It also acknowledges the practical inaccessibility 
of these decisions. It then details the means by which the Author acquired the 
decisions considered, the methodology used to analyze their outcomes, and the 
inherent limitations on the results of this study. 
1. Decision Acquisition
Under the United States Code, ALJ decisions in special-education 
proceedings “shall be made available to the public.”48 The IDEA expressly 
requires this as a “safeguard” against impropriety.49 North Carolina recognizes 
this federal requirement in its special-education policies. These policies require 
that the “SEA [State Educational Agency], after deleting any personally 
identifiable information, must . . . [m]ake [special-education due-process] 
findings and decisions available to the public.”50 
Neither federal law nor North Carolina’s special-education policies 
specify when or where administrative findings and decisions must be made 
available to the public. They are difficult to find. 
ALJ decisions in North Carolina’s special-education due-process 
proceedings are not published in any print compilation. This means they are not 
bound together in books on shelves in libraries. They are not available in 
traditional online legal research databases containing other decisions of the 
North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings.51 Even a paid subscription 
EST) (on file with the West Virginia Law Review). Thus, although it is possible that some first-
tier decisions may remain missing from the Author’s set, those decisions are not available at the 
time of this publication, either online, through records requests, or from any print or electronic 
database containing such administrative decisions. 
48  20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4)(A) (2013) (requiring that all findings and decisions shall be made 
available to the public consistent with the requirements of § 1417(b), relating to the 
confidentiality of student data, information, and records). 
49  Id. 
50  PUB. SCHS. OF N.C., POLICIES GOVERNING SERVICES FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES § 
1504.1.14(d)(2) (2014) [hereinafter N.C. POLICIES], http://ec.ncpublicschools.gov/policies/nc-
policies-governing-services-for-children-with-disabilities/policies-children-disabilities.pdf 
(requiring publication of ALJ decisions after a first-tier review); id. § 1504.1.15(c)(2) (requiring 
publication of state hearing officer decisions after a second-tier review). 
51  “The Office of Administrative Hearings is an independent, quasi-judicial agency under 
Article III, Sec. 11 of the [North Carolina] Constitution . . . .” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750. Parties 
initiating due-process proceedings in special-education litigation do so by filing a petition with 
the Office of Administrative Hearings. Id. § 115C-109.6. Although both Westlaw and Lexis 
contain databases with decisions rendered by ALJs in the Office of Administrative Hearings, 
neither of those databases contains special-education decisions rendered by ALJs pursuant to 
North Carolina General Statute section 115C-109.6. 
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to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report52 or Special Ed. 
Connection53 does not provide all of North Carolina’s ALJ decisions in special-
education due-process proceedings.54 
In the past, North Carolina’s State Board of Education has published a 
smattering of ALJ decisions in special-education cases on its website, but it has 
never posted all of them. In fact, throughout the period of this study, the State 
Board of Education’s website never posted any of the ALJ decisions for many 
of the years covered (2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2012).55 As of the date 
of publication, the page that previously held some of the decisions over the 
covered period had been updated to erase those decisions and include only 
decisions from years beyond the reach of this study, 2014 and 2015.56 
The Author obtained the decisions considered in this Article over a 
three-year period through the cooperation of the Department of Public 
Instruction’s Exceptional Children Division. At the time the Author’s records 
requests began, many requested decisions had not been redacted to protect the 
children’s confidentiality as required by federal57 and state law.58 Now that 
these decisions have been redacted, they may eventually appear on the State 
Board of Education’s website. All decisions considered in this study are 
available on Campbell Law’s Scholarly Repository.59 
The analysis presented here reports the results observed through a 
systematic analysis of all presently available first-tier ALJ decisions in North 
Carolina’s special-education due-process proceedings in cases filed from 
January 2000 through December 2012. This data set includes 97 ALJ decisions 
52  Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report, LRP PUBLICATIONS, http://www. 
shoplrp.com/product_p/300001.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
53  SPECIAL ED CONNECTION, http://www.specialedconnection.com/LrpSecStoryTool/splash. 
jsp  (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
54  While some of North Carolina’s ALJ decisions in special-education decisions are available 
in these resources, many are missing. This Author compiled additional decisions not available in 
these resources through public records requests. 
55  Hearing Decisions, PUB. SCHS. OF N.C., http://ec.ncpublicschools.gov/parent-resources/ 
dispute-resolution/due-process-hearings/hearing-decisions (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
56  Id. 
57  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4)(A) (2013) (providing that decisions “shall be made available 
to the public consistent with the requirements of 20 U.S.C. § 1417(b)” (relating to the 
confidentiality of data, information, and records)); id. § 1417(b)–(c) (prohibiting disclosure of 
confidential information, including “any personally identifiable data, information, and records” 
for a particular child); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(d) (2015) (requiring publication of hearing officer 
decisions “after deleting any personally identifiable information”). 
58  See N.C. POLICIES, supra note 50, § 1504-1.14(d) (requiring that the State Educational 
Agency (SEA) must make hearing officer decisions public only “after deleting any personally 
identifiable information”). 
59  Scholarly Repository, CAMPBELL LAW, http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/oah/ (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
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resolving cases filed throughout the covered period. The following table 
reflects the number of cases initiated and litigated through first-tier review in 
each year throughout the period studied. 
The remainder of this section explains the methodology used to analyze 
these decisions and the inherent limitations on the results of that analysis. 
2. Research Goals and Methodology
Many forms of empirical research are available to investigate targeted 
subjects or phenomena. The analytical approach depends in large part upon the 
study’s objectives. The two primary objectives of this research did, in fact, 
determine the empirical methods utilized here. 
This research initially sought to discover what actually happens in the 
proceedings studied. For example, how many special-education due-process 
complaints are, in fact, pressed through to a hearing annually? Has the rate 
changed as a result of changes in the law? What is the rate at which ALJs 
resolve these disputes in favor of parent petitioners versus school-system 
petitioners? Does this rate change by county, parties’ representation status, 
disability of the child at issue, number of issues raised, or some other 
identifiable factor? What is the rate at which parents, as opposed to school 
systems, initiate due-process proceedings and press them through to final 
written decision? This study was designed to enable the Author to report this 
type of observable outcome data to establish a factual foundation for further 
dialogue about the strengths and weaknesses of the procedural process provided 
to parties in special-education disputes in North Carolina and across the 
country. 
The second primary goal of this research was to compile data about the 
relation that particular variables might have to outcomes in first-tier due-
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process proceedings in North Carolina. This study sought to establish the 
strength of correlations between particular variables to provide meaningful 
context about the observations reported. 
Given this study’s primary purposes to discover what is actually 
happening in North Carolina’s first-tier due-process proceedings, and to 
identify particular variables that coordinate highly with particular outcomes or 
changes in outcomes, the Author relied upon two principal empirical methods. 
First, the Author utilized an Excel spreadsheet to code all ALJ 
decisions studied, recording facts in each case on a number of significant 
variables. The coded variables included, inter alia, the identity of petitioner 
(parent or school system), the identity of respondent, parties’ representation 
status (pro se or represented), the type of public school (traditional or charter), 
county of origin, the identity of the prevailing party, the type of disability of the 
child whose education was at issue, the age of the child whose education was at 
issue, the number of issues addressed by the ALJ, the number of witnesses 
presented by each party, whether the case was resolved on a procedural or 
substantive ground, the identity of the presiding ALJ, and the attorney of record 
for each party (if any). Once all of the decisions were coded, the Author 
grouped decisions based on select variables and combinations of variables to 
identify the outcomes reported. 
Second, once the Author accumulated foundational data pursuant to the 
Excel analysis described above, three principal statistical measures were 
utilized to evaluate that data. Pearson’s Chi-squared test determined the 
statistical significance of particular independent variables on outcomes 
identified. Pearson’s product-moment coefficient identified the strength of 
correlation between particular variables. Finally, when evaluating the influence 
of multiple dependent variables simultaneously on outcomes in first-tier 
decisions, the Author used a multiple linear regression analysis. 
3. Limitations Inherent in Study Methodology and Results
Research of the type reported here is subject to inherent limitations. 
This Article addresses them as they become significant to particular 
discussions. Two fundamental limitations, however, warrant recognition up 
front. 
First, nothing about the data reported here offers any explanation of the 
merits of any particular case or of any group of cases. Whether petitioners bring 
meritorious complaints cannot be determined through this study. Additionally, 
whether ALJs resolve these complaints properly on the facts presented cannot 
be determined through this study. Thus, for example, the finding that parent 
petitioners rarely prevail when they proceed pro se does not provide any insight 
about whether pro se parent petitioners have meritorious complaints or whether 
ALJs resolve those complaints correctly on the facts presented. 
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Second, this study does not include special-education due-process 
complaints that are resolved short of a written ALJ decision via settlement60 or 
that are pursued through the State’s investigatory complaint process.61 Thus, 
this study cannot determine whether consideration of complaints resolved 
under those circumstances would somehow illuminate the outcomes observed 
through this study.62 
With this background and these caveats, this Article next discusses the 
foundational data drawn from these decisions. 
III. EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS: CHANGES IN THE LAW AND THEIR IMPACT ON
TIER-ONE HEARING FREQUENCY AND OUTCOMES 
The United States Government Accountability Office recently reported 
a general nationwide decline in the number of special-education “due process” 
cases pressed forward to a full, written decision.63 Other analysts have 
identified increases in particular contexts.64 As the search for data on the 
60  The Department of Public Instruction publishes some data about aggregate numbers of 
mediations requested, but this Author did not have access to the complaints inspiring those 
mediations or the outcomes of those mediations, and they are not included in this study. See End-
of-Year Reports, PUB. SCHS. OF N.C., http://ec.ncpublicschools.gov/ec/parent-resources/dispute-
resolution/end-of-year-reports (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) (providing some data about numbers of 
special-education mediations). 
61  See N.C. POLICIES, supra note 50, §§ 1501-10.1–10.3 (adopting a state complaint 
procedure to address complaints “filed by an organization or individual from another State” 
(even if they are not a parent of a child with a disability) and requiring an “independent on-site 
investigation” if necessary); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151–53 (requiring that each state receiving funds 
under the IDEA must establish written procedures to permit filing complaints directly with the 
SEA on behalf of interested organizations and individuals, including non-parents and individuals 
and organizations from other states, and ensuring that such complaints are resolved within 60 
days including through “an independent on-site investigation” if necessary). 
62  See Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An 
Analytical and Empirical Assessment, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1614 (2001) (noting similar 
limitations inherent in an empirical study considering North Carolina ALJ decisions outside the 
special-education context). 
63  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: IMPROVED
PERFORMANCE MEASURES COULD ENHANCE OVERSIGHT OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2 (2014), 
http://gao.gov/assets/670/665434.pdf (noting that most of the reported decline in the number of 
special-education cases nationally over the last decade is a result of a decline in the number of 
cases in New York, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia); Weber, supra note 23, at 508–09 
(noting that according to one source “the latest data [through 2012] show[s] a 10% decline in the 
number of hearing requests over the past seven years, and a 58% decline in hearings held”). 
64  See, e.g., infra notes 77–78 and accompanying text (offering the data from North Carolina 
reflecting an increase in the number of such cases in this State between 2007 and 2012 when 
compared to the period between 2000 and 2005); Perry A. Zirkel, Autism Litigation Under the 
IDEA: A New Meaning of “Disproportionality”?, 24 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 92, 95 (2011) 
(noting the results of a study concluding that the number of special-education cases pressed 
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prevalence of special-education due-process hearings continues, this Article 
offers the first consideration of North Carolina’s unique impartial due-process 
hearing procedure, the frequency of these hearings in this State, and their 
outcomes.65 
The North Carolina General Assembly substantially revised the state’s 
special-education laws in 2006. These revisions included changes that could 
impact the number of special-education complaints filed and pressed forward to 
a full hearing. 
The 2006 amendments, for example, clarified the state’s goal with 
respect to educating children with disabilities as matching (and not exceeding) 
the baseline required by the IDEA;66 incorporated the pre-hearing, state-funded 
mediation option introduced by the 2004 amendments to the IDEA;67 reflected 
the 2005 United States Supreme Court decision in Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. 
Weast,68 placing the burden of proof in special-education litigation proceedings 
on the petitioner, including petitioner parents; and enlarged the applicable 
statute of limitations.69 
When this research began, the Author selected the particular 12 years 
(2000–2012) of study because this period spanned 6 years prior to North 
through to a written decision on the issues of FAPE and LRE increased over the 15-year period 
studied, from 1993 through 2008). 
65  Other academics have begun to empirically examine this process in other states and for 
other purposes. See, e.g., COLKER, supra note 24 (examining the shortcomings of the IDEA 
through its evolution and effectiveness in Ohio, Florida, New Jersey, California, and the District 
of Columbia); Colker, supra note 24 (identifying outcomes in Ohio’s special-education 
complaint proceedings and comparing them to outcomes in that state’s due-process proceedings); 
Perry A. Zirkel, Special Education Hearing Officers: Balance and Bias, 24 J. DISABILITY POL’Y 
STUD. 67 (2012) (evaluating claims of bias in special-education hearing officers and proposing 
five factors other than bias that generate disproportionate success for schools over parents). 
66  Before the 2006 amendments, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded: “North 
Carolina apparently does require more than the [IDEA]. The special education program must 
provide the child with an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible, ensuring that 
the child has an opportunity to reach her full potential commensurate with the opportunity given 
other children.” Burke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Denton ex rel. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 983 (4th Cir. 
1990). North Carolina’s 2006 amendments repealed the statute interpreted by the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals and replaced it with new legislation consistent with the standard established in 
the IDEA. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.1 (2015). 
67  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2013) (requiring states to ensure that parties may resolve special-
education “disputes through a mediation process” even “prior to filing of a complaint”); 34 
C.F.R. § 300.506 (2015) (affirming and elaborating upon the pre-hearing mediation requirement 
in the IDEA). 
68  546 U.S. 49, 49 (2005) (holding that under the IDEA, the burden is on the petitioner 
challenging an Individualized Education Plan). 
69  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.6(b) (“Notwithstanding any other law, the party shall file a 
petition . . . that sets forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than one year before the 
party knew or reasonably should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis for the 
petition.”). 
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Carolina’s 2006 revisions to its special-education laws and 6 years after those 
revisions. The Author set out to determine the revisions’ effects on the number 
of due-process complaints proceeding to a full first-tier hearing resolved 
through a written ALJ decision. 
This section offers an overview of the 2006 amendments and 2005 
Supreme Court decision that prompted the research offered here and then 
presents relevant data extracted from the database of catalogued ALJ decisions 
included in this study. 
A. Statutory Changes in North Carolina’s Special-Education Goals and 
Standard 
North Carolina’s 2006 special-education amendments repealed former 
North Carolina General Statute section 115C-106, which set the previous 
special-education goal for the state. 
The repealed statute established a state special-education standard 
greater than that required by the IDEA. It stated: “The General Assembly of 
North Carolina hereby declares that the policy of the State is to ensure every 
child a fair and full opportunity to reach his full potential . . . .”70 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted this now-repealed 
statute and concluded that “North Carolina apparently does require more than 
the [IDEA]. The special education program must provide the child with an 
equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible, ensuring that the child 
has an opportunity to reach her full potential commensurate with the 
opportunity given other children.”71 
The IDEA requires (and has required throughout the period covered by 
this study) that in order to be eligible for federal assistance under the Act, each 
state must “establish[] a goal of providing full educational opportunity to all 
children with disabilities.”72 The IDEA does not require (and has never 
required) that the state offer a program that would allow each child to “reach 
her full potential” or enjoy an “equal opportunity to learn.”73 
North Carolina’s “extra” statutory language about educating to a 
child’s “full potential” and with “equal opportunity” was repealed from the 
70  2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 69 (repealing former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106, effective on and 
after July 1, 2006). 
71  Burke Cty., 895 F.2d at 983. 
72  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(2). 
73  Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189–200 (1982) (establishing that the EHA 
(Education of the Handicapped Act), now renamed the IDEA, contains “no requirement . . . that 
States maximize the potential of handicapped children ‘commensurate with the opportunity 
provided to other children’” and “no additional requirement that the services . . . provided be 
sufficient to maximize each child’s potential” or offer “strict equality of opportunity or services,” 
but only “the requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer 
some educational benefit upon the handicapped child”). 
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North Carolina legislation in 2006 and replaced with language identical to that 
found in the IDEA. North Carolina’s new legislation asserts: “The goal of the 
State is to provide full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities 
who reside in the State.”74 
This apparent equalization of the standards set by federal and state law 
could impact the number of claims asserted and the outcomes of those that 
persist through to a written ALJ decision. Intuitively, one might guess that 
following the reduction in the educational standard in North Carolina, parents 
would present fewer claims. Why? If we presume parents know the law, as we 
must, parents should demand less of public schools following the change in the 
law, realizing that their children’s entitlement had decreased. 
Intuitively, one might also guess that when the educational standard in 
North Carolina was reduced to equal the national one, parents would prevail 
less often in the claims asserted. Why? The educational entitlement over which 
they litigated decreased.75 Data derived from this study casts some doubt on 
these intuitive conclusions.76 
On the first question, whether the reduction of North Carolina’s 
educational standard to equal the national one reduces the number of claims 
pressed by parents to full hearing, the data counters intuition. This change in 
the law did not reduce the number of claims heading to full hearing. Instead, 
there was a 22% increase in the number of cases litigated to a final ALJ 
decision in the six-year period after passage of the 2006 amendments as 
compared to the six-year period prior to their passage.77 
Although North Carolina’s general public school population increased 
over this period, the number of children entitled to receive services under the 
IDEA did not. Instead, in North Carolina in the years following the 2006 
amendments, the number of children between the ages of 3 and 21 entitled to 
74  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.1. 
75  One might alternatively hypothesize, of course, that there should be no change in 
outcomes under this circumstance because school systems would simply diminish their provision 
of services so as to maintain the risk of loss at comparable levels. 
76  See infra Part IV.A. 
77  From 2000 to 2005, there were 41 cases. From 2007 to 2012, there were 50 cases. The rate 
of increase = (50-41)/41 = 22%. This calculation treats the year of 2006 as a year of transition 
(and does not include the six cases filed that year). This is so for one primary reason: it is 
impossible to determine precisely when each case was filed, as no filing date is offered in the 
decisions, making it difficult to determine whether each was filed before or after the statutory 
change became effective in July 2006. While the decisions often identify when the hearing was 
held, they do not indicate precisely when the complaint was filed. Thus, a case heard in August 
may have been filed before or after the statutory change became effective. Interestingly, the 
number of fully litigated complaints increased between 2006 and 2012, while the number of 
North Carolina children eligible for IDEA’s protections decreased. See infra note 78 and 
accompanying text. Further research beyond the scope of this Article is required to determine the 
cause of the increase in the number of fully litigated cases and the decline in the total number of 
children served under the IDEA. 
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services under the IDEA declined by 2.43% from 192,451 children in 2006 to 
187,767 children in 2011.78 In other words, although the total number of 
children in public school in North Carolina increased 4.39% from 1,444,481 in 
2006 to 1,507,865 in 2011, the most recent year for which this data is 
available,79 the number of those children who were eligible for special 
education under the IDEA decreased.80 Despite the decrease in the relevant 
population, the number of special-education cases to proceed through full 
hearing increased over that period by 22%.81 
78  See IDEA Section 618 Data Products: State Level Data Files, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/osepidea/618-data/state-level-data-files/index.html#bcc (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2015) [hereinafter State Level Data Files]. Although the total number of North 
Carolina children served under the IDEA increased slightly in 2012 over 2011 to 190,098, id., 
there remained an overall decline of 1.22% in the number of children served since 2006. This 
Article reports the measure of decline through 2011 in the text above because 2011 is the most 
recent year for which the National Center for Educational Statistics has reported comparison data 
on the total number of children educated in North Carolina public schools. It is interesting to note 
that the number of IDEA-eligible children in North Carolina between 2000 and 2006 increased 
by 11.20% from 173,060 in 2000 to 192,451 in 2006. Id. This growth in the number of IDEA-
eligible children was consistent with the growth in the number of children enrolled in public 
schools generally in North Carolina during the period from 2000 through 2006. Over that period, 
the number of children enrolled in public schools increased by 11.66% from 1,293,638 in 2000 to 
1,444,481 in 2006. See Table 203.20: Enrollment in Public and Secondary Schools by Region, 
State, and Jurisdiction: Selected Years 1990 Through Fall 2023, DIGEST OF EDUCATION, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_203.20.asp (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2015) [hereinafter DIGEST STATISTICS]. 
79  See DIGEST STATISTICS, supra note 78. The National Center for Educational Statistics 
projects, but does not offer an accurate count of, the total number of children educated in North 
Carolina public schools in 2012. This projection estimates the total number of children educated 
in North Carolina public schools in 2012 to be 1,515,700. Id. Assuming this projection was 
correct, the total number of children educated in North Carolina public schools from 2006 
through 2012 increased by 4.93% while the number of IDEA-educated children declined over the 
same period by 1.22%, as explained in footnote 78. 
80  Other authors have considered the reasons for changes in IDEA eligibility numbers. See, 
e.g., Mark Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 83 (2009). Such analysis is
beyond the scope of this Article, which seeks only to disclose data regarding first-tier hearings to 
inspire further research and normative consideration by others. It is worth recognizing, however, 
that North Carolina’s decrease in IDEA-eligible students from 2006 to 2011 is consistent with a 
national decline in IDEA-eligible students over the same period, despite a slight national increase 
in public school enrollment overall. Across the country in 2006, 6,693,279 students received aid 
under the IDEA, see State Level Data Files, supra note 78, and 49,315,842 students were 
enrolled in public schools, see DIGEST STATISTICS, supra note 78. However in 2011 only 
6,530,522 students received aid under the IDEA, see State Level Data Files, supra note 78, 
despite an increase in the overall public school population to 49,521,669 students, see DIGEST
STATISTICS, supra note 78. This reflects a 2.431% decrease nationally, similar to the 2.434% 
decline in North Carolina, in the number of IDEA-eligible students between 2006 and 2011, 
despite a slight national increase in public school enrollment by .417%. 
81  It warrants mention that North Carolina experienced an increase in the number of 
complaints initiated even after the 2004 amendments to the IDEA that authorized the imposition 
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On the second question, whether parents prevail less often under North 
Carolina’s reduced educational standard for children with disabilities, the data 
is interesting and invites further study. It should be noted, of course, that the 
data presented here does not inform causation. Nothing here suggests that the 
change in the law causes any change in win/loss rates for parents. Factors other 
than changes in the law impact these rates. Most significantly, according to this 
research, changes associated with parental representation and pro se status82 
change at roughly the same rate as the changes in the win rate for parents 
before and after the 2006 amendments.83 
With this caveat, generally speaking, intuition pans out here to a small, 
but statistically insignificant, degree. The percentage of cases in which parents 
prevailed on at least one issue dropped 9.7 percentage points in the six years 
following passage of the amendments.84 Conversely, the percentage of cases in 
which school systems prevailed on at least one issue increased by 13.5 
percentage points over the same period.85 
Notably, however, the number of pro se parents also increased in the 
six years following the 2006 amendments.86 This number increased by nearly 8 
percentage points. This increase in parental pro se status closely approximates 
the decrease in parental success. And pro se status better predicts parental 
success than the changes in North Carolina’s special-education laws87 
of attorneys’ fees on parents and parents’ attorneys for filing or pursuing frivolous due-process 
proceedings. 
82  See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the data regarding outcomes for parties represented by 
parents as compared to parties proceeding pro se). 
83  The parental “win” rate, treating a “win” as success on any part of a claim even if not the 
entire claim, declined by 9.7 percentage points, and parental representation by counsel declined 
by 7.7 percentage points. 
84  Parents prevailed on at least one issue in 13 of 41 cases between 2000 and 2005, 31.7% of 
the cases over that period. From 2007 to 2012, parents prevailed on at least one issue in only 11 
of 50 cases, or 22.0% of the cases over that period. The p-value representing the statistical 
significance of the change in “win” rates pre- and post-2006 is .096, too high to represent 
statistical significance using Pearson’s Chi-squared measure. 
85  Schools prevailed on at least one issue in 33 of 41 cases between 2000 and 2005, or in 
80.5% of the cases. From 2007 to 2012, schools prevailed on at least one issue in 47 of 50 cases, 
or in 94.0% of the cases. Notably, however, this increase in school “wins” is not statistically 
significant using Pearson’s Chi-squared measure (p = .099). 
86  While this research cannot establish the cause of this observation, two changes in the law 
are interesting to think about in this context. First, the change in North Carolina’s substantive 
entitlement in 2006 raises the question of whether some attorneys have begun tightening the 
standards by which they might take cases to minimize their risk of loss. Additionally, the 
addition of authority to impose attorneys’ fees upon parents’ attorneys, should they pursue what 
ends up being characterized as a frivolous claim, may have deterred some attorneys from getting 
involved in these cases. Observations like these are merely speculation for further research. 
87  It is impossible to determine which, if any, of the significant changes in 2006 (the change 
in the educational standard applied to children with disabilities, the addition of pre-complaint 
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governing children with disabilities using a multiple linear regression 
analysis.88 
B. Statutory Changes in the Availability of State-Funded, Pre-Complaint 
Mediation Prior to Initiating Tier-One Hearings 
Just as scrutiny of first-tier decisions following the 2006 changes to the 
statutory educational standard for children with disabilities revealed some 
counter-intuitive results, an examination of those decisions in light of the 2006 
addition of pre-hearing mediation options also exposes counter-intuitive results. 
This section first explains the 2006 amendments regarding availability of pre-
hearing mediation and then reports the data on the effect of these amendments 
on the numbers of cases pressed forward through a full hearing. 
mediation, the change in the statute of limitations, etc.) correlated most with the observable 
effects on frequency and outcomes in first-tier special-education cases. Thus, this Article cannot 
and does not conclude that the change in the standard (which is the focus of this section of this 
Article) had the effect of decreasing parents’ success. Again, however, the decline in parental 
success by 9.7 percentage points was not statistically significant at this time (p = .096). Should 
the pattern observed here continue, however, it could become statistically significant, particularly 
given its current proximity to significance. 
88  The following table reflects the results of a multiple linear regression analysis of outcomes 
(parental success) measured against the dependent variables of representation status and pre- or 
post-2006 filing, showing that the two dependent variables account for approximately 40% of the 
outcome (see Multiple R value) and that the influence of pro se status is statistically significant (p 
= .0002) at a coefficient of -.36, but the influence of pre- or post-2006 is not (p = .99): 
Again, no causal determinations about any factor considered may be reached by this study. All 
information is merely descriptive and reflective of correlations. This Author continues to further 
catalogue the ALJ decisions under review to determine whether any additional meaningful 
statistical patterns emerge. This Author also encourages others to engage in further study seeking 
greater understanding about causation. 
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Until mid-2005, the IDEA required that mediation be available only 
after a due-process complaint was filed. In the 2004 re-authorization of the Act, 
in provisions that took effect on July 1, 2005, Congress required that states 
make mediation available whether or not any party had requested a due-process 
hearing.89 
North Carolina revised its special-education legislation to reflect this 
new federal requirement in 2006. From that time forward, North Carolina’s law 
has stated: “It is the policy of this State to encourage local educational agencies 
and parents to seek mediation involving any dispute under this Article, 
including matters arising before or after filing” a due-process complaint 
seeking a hearing before an ALJ.90 
North Carolina’s policies governing services for children with 
disabilities further require that each local educational agency “must ensure that 
procedures are established and implemented to allow parties to disputes 
involving any matter under these Policies, including matters arising prior to the 
filing of a petition for a due process hearing, to resolve disputes through a 
mediation process.”91 They also require that the “SEA [state educational 
agency] must bear the cost of the mediation process,” making it free for parents 
of children with disabilities and for local school systems.92 
Given that North Carolina’s 2006 amendments to its special-education 
laws aligned federal and state law on the substantive educational goal of the 
legislation and added a non-adversarial, pre-hearing mediation option, one 
might expect the number of fully litigated special-education claims to decline 
post amendments. This did not happen. 
From January 2000 to December 2005 (prior to the effectiveness of 
North Carolina’s 2006 revisions), 41 of the special-education cases available 
for this research progressed through a full contested case hearing and written 
ALJ decision. From January 2007 through December 2012 (following the 
effectiveness of North Carolina’s 2006 revisions), 50 special-education cases 
progressed through a full contested case hearing and written ALJ decision. As 
89  20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) (2013) (requiring mediation even in “matters arising prior to the 
filing of a complaint”). According to the legislative record, Congress enacted this change to (1) 
capitalize on cost savings realized through previous special-education mediations and (2) reduce 
the adversarial character of special-education proceedings. The Senate Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions reported that it revised the mediation timeline in order to build 
upon the national success in resolving disputes through mediation. S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 36–37 
(2003). The Committee noted Michigan and Texas surveys that found 82.3% and 96%, 
respectively, of people who used mediation would do so again. Id. In Texas, 77% of cases settled 
in mediation. Id. at 37. This saved an estimated $50 million in attorneys’ fees and litigation 
expenses. Id. California experienced even greater success, with 93% of mediated cases settling. 
Id. 
90  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.4(a) (2015) (emphasis added). 
91  N.C. POLICIES, supra note 50, § 1504-1.7(a) (emphasis added). 
92  Id. § 1504-1.7(b)(4). 
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noted above, this reflects a 22% increase in the number of cases litigated to a 
final ALJ decision in the six-year period after passage of the 2006 amendments 
as compared to the six-year period prior to that passage.93 Interestingly, the two 
years in which the greatest numbers of fully litigated cases were filed, 2010 (12 
cases) and 2011 (13 cases), both arose after this change in the law. 
This statistical increase does not establish that the 2006 amendments 
caused an increase in fully litigated tier-one hearings. To the contrary, other 
factors, beyond the special-education laws of the state, may have influenced 
this increase. In fact, across the country in many jurisdictions the rate of fully 
litigated hearings is declining.94 However, as noted above, the number of 
children served in special education in North Carolina decreased from 192,451 
in 2006 to 190,098 in 2012,95 representing a 1.22% decrease in the number of 
students served while the rate of fully litigated tier-one hearings increased by 
22%. A comprehensive study of factors that might influence the rate of increase 
in special-education litigation is beyond the scope of this Article. 
In the end, this research does not determine whether North Carolina’s 
2006 amendments changing the state’s special-education goal and providing 
pre-hearing mediation at public expense had any direct causal impact. This 
research does reflect an uptick in litigation between 2007 and 2012 when 
compared to numbers in 2000 through 2005. Notably, however, in 2012, the 
most recent year considered, the smallest number (three) of special-education 
contested cases reached final written decision by an ALJ. It has yet to be 
determined whether this downtick in fully litigated tier-one hearings indicates 
the beginning of a trend toward fewer fully litigated cases or stands alone as an 
outlier.
96
 Further research may begin to answer these questions. 
C. Clarification of the Burden of Proof and Statute of Limitations 
Two clarifications of procedural obligations on participants in North 
Carolina’s first-tier special-education claims warrant attention. In 2005, the 
Supreme Court clarified that the burden of proof in these administrative 
93  See supra note 77 and accompanying text (demonstrating the manner in which this 22% 
increase was determined). 
94  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 63, at 2 (noting that most of the 
reported decline in the number of special-education cases nationally over the last decade is a 
result of a decline in the number of cases in New York, Puerto Rico, and the District of 
Columbia); Weber, supra note 23, at 508–09 (noting that, according to one source, “the latest 
data [through 2012] show[s] a 10% decline in the number of hearing requests over the past seven 
years, and a 58% decline in hearings held”). 
95  See State Level Data Files, supra note 78. 
96  The Exceptional Children Division is beginning to load new decisions on its website. 
Some are posted from 2014 and 2015. See Hearing Decisions, supra note 55 (reporting selected 
2014 decisions from Winston-Salem/Forsyth County, Johnston County, and Cherokee County 
and selected 2015 decisions from Charlotte-Mecklenburg). 
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hearings rested with the petitioner, including petitioner parents. The following 
year, the North Carolina legislature amended the governing statute of 
limitations to expand it from 60 days to 1 year. Although the clarification of 
placement of the burden of proof had no impact in this State, the expansion of 
the statutory limitation period opened the door to a larger basis for claims. 
1. Burden of Proof
In 2005 in Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast,97 the United States 
Supreme Court held that petitioners in special-education cases, including 
petitioner parents, retain the burden of proof, and more particularly the burden 
of persuasion, on all claims asserted.98 Until that time, jurisdictions had been 
split on this question. Some courts held that after a parent identified a concern 
about a child not receiving the education to which the child was entitled under 
the IDEA, the burden of persuasion shifted to the school system to establish 
that the school offered a free appropriate public education through a properly 
developed individualized education plan (IEP) in the least restrictive 
environment.99 
In North Carolina, however, ALJs had always imposed the burden of 
proof on the petitioner, including parent petitioners.100 Well before Schaffer, 
one North Carolina ALJ explained the following in response to petitioner 
parents’ motion to assign the burden of proof to the respondent school district: 
After receiving briefs and arguments, the Undersigned 
ruled . . . that the Petitioners bore the burden of proof. Neither 
the statutes involved nor the Fourth Circuit case law address 
97  546 U.S. 49, 49 (2005). 
98  Id. at 56–57 (noting that the “burden of proof” historically encompassed both the burden 
of persuasion and the burden of production and emphasizing that this case implicates only the 
burden of persuasion, attaching to the party who will lose if the evidence is closely balanced). 
99  See, e.g., Oberti ex rel. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3rd Cir. 1993) (“In 
practical terms, the school has an advantage when a dispute arises under the Act: the school has 
better access to relevant information, greater control over the potentially more persuasive 
witnesses (those who have been directly involved with the child’s education), and greater overall 
educational expertise than the parents.”); Lascari ex rel. Lascari v. Bd. of Educ., 560 A.2d 1180, 
1188–89 (N.J. 1989) (stating that in view of the school district’s “better access to relevant 
information,” parents’ obligations “should be merely to place the issue of appropriateness of the 
IEP” before the school, and “the school board should then bear the burden of proving that the IEP 
was appropriate”). 
100  See, e.g., Student v. Wake Cty. Pub. Sch. Sys. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 0171 and No. 01 
EDC 0802, slip op. at 3 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Sept. 11, 2002); Parent v. Wake Cty. Pub. 
Sch. Bd., 00 EDC 1452, slip op. at 10 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 6, 2001); Student v. 
Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ., 00 EDC 0616, slip op. at 13 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. June 4, 
2001); Parent v. Columbus Cty. Bd. of Educ., 00 EDC 0705, slip op. at 13 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 18, 2001). 
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the issue of burden of proof. The other circuits are mixed. The 
Undersigned found that in this particular case that the burden 
of proving tha[t] an IEP that had been jointly developed and 
implemented for the length of time involved failed to meet the 
legal standards as well as the other issues presented at hearing 
fell to the party [the Petitioner parents] challenging the 
plan . . . .101 
Given that North Carolina placed the burden of proof on petitioners 
throughout the period covered by this research, and long before Schaffer in 
2005, it is not surprising that the legislature did not change that burden in its 
2006 overhaul of the State’s special-education law.102 And it makes sense that 
this decision had no identifiable impact on outcomes here.103 
2. Statute of Limitations
Although North Carolina had already placed the burden of proof on 
petitioners prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Schaffer, North Carolina 
held on to its 60-day statutory limitations period until prompted by changes in 
the federal law to enlarge it. 
The 2004 revisions to the IDEA, which took effect on July 1, 2005, 
introduced for the first time a federal statute of limitations in special-education 
administrative claims. The relevant 2004 revision provided: 
A parent or agency shall request an impartial due process 
hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or 
should have known about the alleged action that forms the 
basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time 
101  Wake Cty., No. 01 ED 0171 and No. 01 EDC 0802, slip op. at 3. 
102  A number of jurisdictions have, however, modified their state special-education laws to 
place the burden of proof on school systems, even in cases where the parent is the petitioner. See, 
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-1.1 (West 2015) (providing that the burden of proof in special-
education cases falls on the school system); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(1) (McKinney 2015) 
(imposing the burden of proof on school systems to establish that the school offers FAPE, but 
leaving burden of proof on parents when they seek “tuition reimbursement for a unilateral 
placement” in a private school); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 388.507 (2015) (“Whenever a due process 
hearing is held pursuant to the [IDEA] . . . the school district has the burden of proof and the 
burden of production.”). Other states continue to consider legislation to accomplish this goal. See 
S. 0390, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015); H. 0344, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2015); MD. COAL. FOR SPECIAL EDUC. RIGHTS & BURDEN OF PROOF, 
www.burdenofproofmd.org. (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). No such legislation has been considered 
in North Carolina. 
103  See supra Part III.A–B (offering the statistical data to support the conclusion that the 2006 
changes in North Carolina’s special-education laws had no statistically significant impact on 
frequency or outcomes of first-tier hearings). 
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limitation for requesting such a hearing under this [part], in 
such time as the State law allows.104 
At the time this federal legislation passed and took effect, North 
Carolina relied upon a generic 60-day limitation period imported from the state 
administrative procedure act. This catch-all provision provided that “[u]nless 
another statute or a federal statute or regulation sets a time limitation for the 
filing of a petition in contested cases against a specified agency, the general 
limitation for the filing of a petition in a contested case is 60 days.”105 
The 60-day statutory limitation period presented a challenge to parents 
seeking review of issues arising under the IDEA. Claims were regularly 
dismissed in violation of that limit.106 
Following implementation of the 2004 revisions to the IDEA, in 2006 
the North Carolina legislature revised its special-education laws. In these 
revisions, the North Carolina legislature included a specific statutory 
limitations period within the State’s special-education laws. As a result, when 
this legislation became effective on July 10, 2006, the catch-all provision in 
North Carolina’s administrative procedure act no longer applied in this context. 
Instead, the particular limitation period began to apply. This limitation period 
extended the time within which complaints arising under the IDEA must be 
asserted in a due-process complaint from 60 days to 1 year.107 While one might 
expect this change to reduce the number of cases dismissed on procedural 
grounds in the most recent six years under review,108 that was not the case. This 
change had no statistically significant impact on the number of claims 
ultimately dismissed by written decision of an ALJ for violation of the statute 
of limitations. 
104  20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(2)(C) (2013). 
105  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-23(f) (2015); C.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 241 F.3d 374, 
384–85 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 818 (2001) (holding that the North Carolina 
Administrative Procedure Act’s sixty-day statute of limitations was appropriately applied in 
special-education cases and was consistent with IDEA along with the accompanying notice 
requirements contained in the North Carolina statute). 
106  See, e.g., Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 06 EDC 1129 (N.C. Office 
of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 7, 2007); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 06 EDC 
1284 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 2007); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 
No. 06 EDC 0464 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. July 17, 2006); C.L. v. N. High Sch. Principal, 
04 EDC 0268 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 8, 2005); Student v. Bd. of Educ., No. 04 EDC 
0838 and No. 04 EDC 0854 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 22, 2004); Student v. Cabarrus 
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 00 EDC 0616 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. June 4, 2001); Parents v. Terrel 
Lane Middle Sch., 01 EDC 0210 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Apr. 2, 2001); Student v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schs., 01 EDC 0110 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 23, 2001). 
107  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.6(b). 
108  In fact, from 2000 through 2006, only eight claims were dismissed on these procedural 
grounds, but from 2007 through 2012, 18 cases were dismissed. 
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Ultimately, recent changes in law ranging from re-calibrating the level 
of education required for children with disabilities to lengthening the statute of 
limitations, failed to have the impacts intuitively expected. Even free pre-
complaint mediation, which has reduced the number of fully litigated due-
process proceedings nationwide, has not correlated with that consequence here. 
Further research is necessary to fully understand these outcomes. 
IV. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: TRANSCENDING TIER-ONE ANECDOTES WITH
DATA AND RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF REPRESENTATION 
Having established in Parts II and III the legal and empirical 
foundation necessary to give context to statistical data depicting the current 
litigation landscape in North Carolina’s special-education due-process 
proceedings, this Part shifts gears and offers the litigation data. It introduces 
data on North Carolina’s fully litigated first-tier special-education litigation in 
three categories: data on parents and children, data on traditional public 
schools, and data on charter schools. 
A. Data on Parents 
Empirical review of first-tier administrative decisions in special-
education cases reveals a number of interesting statistical observations about 
the parents involved. First, parents are overwhelmingly petitioners, not 
respondents, in these cases. Second, parent petitioners rarely prevail in first-tier 
hearings. Third, parent outcomes improve with legal counsel. Finally, with two 
exceptions, parent outcomes remain consistent regardless of the age of the child 
whose education is at issue or the type of disability accommodated. This 
section of the Article reports the data supporting each of these observations. 
1. Parents, Not Schools, Typically Initiate First-Tier Due-Process
Proceedings
Both federal and state laws establish that parents of children with 
disabilities and public school systems educating those children (both traditional 
and charter) may originate due-process proceedings. These proceedings protect 
the substantive right of children with disabilities to a free appropriate public 
education in the least restrictive educational environment possible. 
The IDEA requires that states provide “an opportunity for any party” to 
present a due-process complaint “with respect to any matter relating to the 
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child [with a 
disability], or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such 
child.”109 The IDEA’s implementing regulations make clear that a “parent or a 
109  20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)(6)(A) (emphasis added). 
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public agency may file a due process complaint” on any of these special-
education issues.110 
North Carolina law mirrors federal law on this point. North Carolina 
General Statutes section 115C-109.6 reiterates that “[a]ny party” may file a 
petition for an “impartial hearing with respect to any matter relating to the 
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child [with a 
disability], or the provision of a free appropriate public education [FAPE] of 
[such] child, or a manifestation determination.”111 The State Board of 
Education Department of Public Instruction’s special-education policies 
likewise confirm that a “parent or an LEA [local educational agency] may file a 
request for a due process hearing on matters related to the identification, 
evaluation or educational placement of a child with a disability, the provision 
of FAPE to the child or a manifestation determination.”112 
Although both parents and school systems are equally entitled to 
initiate due-process proceedings to ensure the full enforcement of the IDEA,113 
parents and school systems do not initiate and pursue these proceedings in 
equal numbers. 
Of the 97 ALJ decisions collected, catalogued, and considered in this 
analysis, parents of children with disabilities initiated the due-process 
proceedings in 94 of them.114 In other words, 96.9% of all the ALJ decisions 
issued over the 12-year period covered by this study resolved complaints raised 
by parents. 
It warrants observation that although 96.9% of due-process 
proceedings under the IDEA are initiated by parents, only a miniscule fraction 
of parents of children with disabilities actually press disputes to this stage. For 
example, in 2011, the year covered by this research with the largest number of 
fully litigated cases, 187,767 children with disabilities were eligible for services 
under the IDEA in North Carolina’s public schools.115 And in that year only 11 
110  34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a). 
111  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.6. 
112  N.C. POLICIES, supra note 50, § 1504-1.8(a)(1). 
113  Neither parents nor school systems are required to initiate due-process proceedings, 
however. And school systems in particular are not required to initiate due process even when 
school officials believe a child is one with a disability who is not receiving appropriate 
accommodations under the IDEA if the child’s parents are informed and the parents refuse 
consent. See, e.g., K.A. v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 741 F.3d 1195, 1206 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that a school district is not required to invoke due process when a parent revokes consent to a 
changed IEP). 
114  Only the following three of the total available set of ALJ decisions reviewed involved 
school-system petitioners: Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Parent, No. 04 EDC 1131 (N.C. Office 
of Admin. Hrgs. Aug. 12, 2004); Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Father, No. 01 EDC 1802 
(N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 2002); Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Mr., No. 00 EDC 
0465 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 12, 2001). 
115  See State Level Data Files, supra note 78. 
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parents filed contested cases that ultimately led to a written decision of an ALJ. 
This means a mere .007% of the families who could initiate the impartial due-
process hearing available under the IDEA actually did so, pressing their 
complaints through to full, written decision before an ALJ. 
2. Parents Rarely Prevail Without an Attorney
Litigation outcomes reflected in written ALJ decisions following first-
tier due-process hearings favor school systems. As noted above, of the 97 
decisions available for analysis, parents of children with disabilities initiated 
94, and school systems started 3.116 This section presents parents’ win/loss 
records in the 94 cases parents initiated. 
In considering these win/loss records, the Author emphasizes three 
important initial observations. First, the win/loss data presented here derives 
only from cases in which the parties did not settle their disputes at a resolution 
meeting prior to hearing,117 during mediation,118 or in the course of the first-tier 
hearing as evidence was exposed. Second, the data presented here reflects only 
cases in which a due-process complaint culminated in a written decision issued 
by an ALJ. Finally, nothing about the data presented here addresses the merits 
of any of the due-process claims counted, and nothing about the data here can 
establish the cause of the success or failure of any particular claim or group of 
claims. 
With these caveats in mind, the win/loss records tabulated in the 
decisions reviewed in preparation of this Article present a provocative picture 
of North Carolina’s special-education litigation at its first-tier administrative 
review. 
How often did petitioner parents prevail at the first-tier administrative 
review on all issues raised in their complaints before the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH) over this period? Parents fully prevailed 
13.8% of the time.119 
116  See supra note 114 and cases cited therein. 
117  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B) (2013) (requiring a resolution meeting after a due-process 
complaint has been filed, but before hearing, unless specified circumstances exist); 34 C.F.R. § 
300.510 (2015) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.7 (2015) (same); N.C. POLICIES, supra note 
50, § 1504-1.11 (same). 
118  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (requiring pre-hearing mediation be available, regardless of 
whether a due-process complaint has been filed, at no cost to parties); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 
(2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.4 (same); N.C. POLICIES, supra note 50, at § 1404-1.7 
(same). 
119  It is interesting to consider this statistic in the context of win rates in other states. For 
example, in Iowa, parents won in 32% of the cases studied. Perry Zirkel et al., Creeping 
Judicialization in Special Education Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27, 37 (2007). In Wisconsin and Minnesota, parents with attorneys 
prevailed fully 14% of the time. Cope-Kasten, supra note 24, at 37. 
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Of the 94 due-process complaints initiated by parents of children with 
disabilities from 2000 through 2012 and not resolved prior to completion of the 
first-tier hearing, parents prevailed following decision by the first-tier ALJ on 
all issues in their complaints in 13 cases.120 And no parent prevailed on all 
issues in a due-process proceeding at any time during the last three years of the 
study.121 
Considering a similar question from an alternative perspective, parents 
lost on all issues raised in their special-education complaints 72.3% of the time. 
They lost on everything in 68 cases out of the 94 cases they presented as 
petitioners. 
Parent petitioners, of course, may raise more than one issue in a single 
due-process complaint. This raises a new question: How often did petitioner 
parents prevail on one issue, but lose on another in their first-tier review before 
OAH? Parents prevailed on at least one issue, and lost on at least one issue in 
an additional 13 cases, 13.8% of the time. 
Of the 94 due-process complaints initiated by parents of children with 
disabilities from 2000 through 2012 and not resolved prior to completion of the 
first-tier hearing, parents prevailed following the hearing before the first-tier 
ALJ on at least one issue in their complaints in 26 cases,122 or 27.7% of the 
120  Student v. Orange Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 08 EDC 2969 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. June 
18, 2009); Student v. Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 2339 (N.C. Office of Admin. 
Hrgs. Aug. 29, 2008); Student v. Granville Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1605 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 29, 2007); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 06 EDC 1129 
(N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 7, 2007); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 
06 EDC 1284 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 2007); Student v. New Hanover Cty. Sch. Bd. of 
Educ., No. 06 EDC 0500 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Aug. 25, 2006); Father v. Randolph Cty. 
Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 05 EDC 1543 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Apr. 18, 2006); Parents v. 
Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 03 EDC 1637 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. June 
20, 2005); Student v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 02 EDC 1461 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. 
Dec. 23, 2002); Father v. Randolph Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 1263 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. Aug. 16, 2002); Parent v. Johnston Cty. Schs., No. 02 EDC 0067 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. June 21, 2002); Ms. v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 0204 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 27, 2002); Mr. L. v. Hickory Pub. Schs., No. 01 EDC 0878 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 13, 2001). 
121  See, e.g., Orange Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 08 EDC 2969 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. June 
18, 2009) (reflecting the most recent case in the period covered by this study in which a parent 
petitioner prevailed on all issues). 
122  Student v. Johnston Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 11 EDC 04970 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. 
Apr. 12, 2012); Student v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 11 EDC 3178 (N.C. Office of Admin. 
Hrgs. Nov. 2011); Student v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 10 EDC 1370 
(N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Oct. 7, 2011); Student v. Wake Cty. Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 09 
EDC 4193 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Apr. 16, 2010); Student v. T.D., No. 09 EDC 2328 
(N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 2009); Student v. T.D., No. 09 EDC 2329 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 2009); Orange Cty. Bd. of Educ.., No. 08 EDC 2969; Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., No. 07 EDC 2339; Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1389 (N.C. Office 
of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 15, 2008); Granville Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1605; Student v. 
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time. These 26 cases include, of course, the 13 cases discussed previously in 
which parents prevailed on all issues and the 13 cases in which parents both 
prevailed and lost on at least one issue. 
Considering this question of partial parental success from another 
perspective, parents lost on at least one issue 86.2% of the time. Of the 94 
complaints brought by parent petitioners, they experienced loss on at least one 
issue in 81 cases. 
The following table reflects some of the data described above in this 
section. It illustrates each of the following pieces of data: (1) the number of 
due-process complaints filed and pursued through a full hearing by parents of 
children with disabilities from 2000 through 2012, (2) the number and 
percentage of cases in which the petitioner parents prevailed on all issues over 
that same period,123 and (3) the number and percentage of cases in which 
petitioner parents prevailed before an ALJ on at least one issue presented for 
hearing.124 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1074 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Aug. 30, 
2007); Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 06 EDC 1129; Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., No. 06 EDC 1284; New Hanover Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 06 EDC 0500; Randolph 
Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 05 EDC 1543; Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 
06 EDC 0464 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. July 17, 2006); Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., No. 03 EDC 1637; Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 02 EDC 1461; Mr. C. v. Union Cty. 
Pub. Schs., No. 02 EDC 0622 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 21, 2002); Student v. Wake 
Cty. Pub. Sch. Sys. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 0171 and No. 0802 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. 
Sept. 11, 2002); Randolph Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 1263; Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 
01 EDC 0204; Johnston Cty. Schs., No. 02 EDC 0067; Mr. L. v. Hickory Pub. Schs., No. 01 
EDC 0878 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 13, 2001); Hickory Pub. Schs., No. 00 EDC 0128; 
Student v. Caldwell Cty. Schs., No. 01 EDC 0083 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Mar. 22, 2001). 
123  This table reflects outcomes in cases in which petitioners prevailed on all issues identified 
in their due-process complaints because, in a majority of cases, ALJs resolve all issues in favor of 
a single party. Of the first-tier final ALJ decisions considered in preparation of this Article, 
86.6% ended with a single party prevailing on all issues. In only a relatively small minority of 
cases (13.4%), the ALJ reached a split decision and determined that each party prevailed on 
portions of the complaint. 
124  Some of the outcomes reflected in this chart were appealed to the second-tier 
administrative review before a State Hearing Review Officer. In those cases, the State Hearing 
Review Officer may (or may not) have reversed some of the ALJ outcomes during the second-
tier review. This Article does not contain data on the rate at which parties pursue second-tier 
administrative review or the outcomes of such appeals. The Author has acquired and is reviewing 
and cataloging North Carolina’s Senior Review Officer (S.R.O.) decisions in special-education 
matters from 2000 through 2012 and will publish the results of that review once complete. 
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Type of 
Petitioner 
Winning percentage in cases 
pursued through issuance of a 
written ALJ decision from 2000 
through 2012 in cases in which 
this party prevailed on all claims. 
Winning percentage in cases 
pursued through issuance of a 
written ALJ decision from 2000 
through 2012 in cases in which this 
party prevailed on at least one issue. 
Parent of a 
Child with a 
Disability 
n = 94 
13.8% 
n = 13 
27.7% 
n = 26 (note that this number 
includes those cases reflected to the 
left in which parent petitioners 
prevailed on all issues) 
These parental success rates are consistent with parental success rates 
in other states where due-process proceedings have been examined, but they are 
inconsistent with parental success rates in the District of Columbia where 
parents enjoy higher rates of representation by legal counsel. In Ohio, for 
example, another state with a two-tiered due-process proceeding, parents 
prevailed in 32.7% of the cases studied, and it was “nearly impossible for 
parents to prevail in Ohio without the assistance of highly sophisticated legal 
counsel.”125 Similarly, in Florida, parents prevailed in only 15.1% of the cases 
initiated, and only one parent prevailed without an attorney or an advocate.126 
Likewise, in New Jersey, in emergent relief petitions, parents prevailed in 
approximately 17% of the cases they initiated, and 63.7% of prevailing parents 
were represented by an attorney.127 
In contrast to the relatively low rates of parental success in North 
Carolina, Ohio, Florida, and New Jersey, parents prevailed in over half (57%) 
of the 100 cases resolved between 2010 and 2011 in the District of 
Columbia.128 In the District of Columbia, however, in contrast to North 
Carolina and other states where data is available, “legal counsel nearly always 
represented” parents of children with disabilities.129 This raises the next 
question: Does parental representation correlate with an increase in favorable 
outcomes for parents in North Carolina’s first-tier hearings? 
125  COLKER, supra note 24, at 149, 151. 
126  Id. at 160 (noting that the single parent who prevailed without an attorney or advocate was 
a “social worker who seemed to have some expertise in special education matters”). 
127  Id. at 177. 
128  Id. at 211. 
129  Id. 
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3. Parents’ Representation Matters
Although school systems typically retain legal counsel in special-
education litigation proceedings,130 parents often do not. In Winkelman ex rel. 
Winkelman v. Parma City School District,131 the Supreme Court highlighted 
and expansively interpreted the authority of parents to appear pro se throughout 
these unique proceedings. This section of the Article first offers background on 
the law authorizing parents to represent themselves and their children pro se in 
these matters. It then presents the statistical relationship between parental 
representation and hearing outcomes. 
 In Winkelman, the Supreme Court addressed the question of “whether 
parents, either on their own behalf or as representatives of the child, may 
proceed in court [in a special-education appeal under the IDEA] unrepresented 
by counsel though they are not trained or licensed as attorneys.”132 The Court 
held that non-lawyer parents of a child with a disability may represent 
themselves and the interests of their children pro se in federal court, because 
IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights that include the 
entitlement to a free appropriate public education for their child.133 The Court 
premised its conclusion on recognition that 
[a]ll concede that . . . parents ha[ve] the statutory right to 
contribute to this process [of developing their child’s 
independent educational program to ensure the child’s access 
to a free appropriate public education] and, when agreement 
[can] not be reached, to participate in administrative 
proceedings including what the Act refers to as an “impartial 
due process hearing.”134 
The Court then determined that because “[t]he parents enjoy 
enforceable rights at the administrative stage . . . it would be inconsistent with 
the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights in 
federal court.”135 
Through its analysis, the Supreme Court highlighted and affirmed 
parents’ authority to proceed in special-education litigation pro se. Naturally, 
then, North Carolina ALJs see a good number of pro se parents in special-
education due-process proceedings. Given the complexity of the law in this 
130  School-system parties were represented by counsel in 100% of the cases in which it was 
possible to determine from the written ALJ decisions whether counsel appeared. 
131  550 U.S. 516, 533 (2007) (holding that the IDEA provides independent and enforceable 
rights to parents, and these rights extend to appropriate public education for their children). 
132  Id. at 520. 
133  Id. at 516. 
134  Id. at 519–20 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2000)). 
135  Id. at 526. 
772 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118 
area, unrepresented parents may face challenges without some legal training or 
support. 
State Hearing Review Officer Joe D. Walters characterized this 
challenge poignantly in resolving a second-tier review of a due-process 
complaint brought by a pro se parent against the Cumberland County Schools. 
He wrote: 
This case illustrates the risks a pro se parent takes in a 
due process hearing. There are very specific rules and 
procedures to follow. Both Petitioners and Respondents are 
held to the same standard and must follow these rules and 
procedures. No specific exception is allowed for a pro se 
parent. The rules and procedures are clearly set forth in federal 
law, state law, federal regulations, and state policies. A failure 
to follow those rules and procedures can be fatal to a 
potentially legitimate claim. Regardless of how valid a claim 
may be, the ALJ and Review Officer are both restricted by the 
specificity of the applicable laws, regulations, and policies. 
The Respondent’s attorney [the school system’s 
attorney] must represent his client. In this case, he clearly used 
the specifics in the law to argue for the Respondent’s position. 
That the Petitioner [parent] perceived this as unfair and did not 
allow her to present her full case is regrettable, but both parties 
have the same hearing rights. . . . In this instance, Respondent 
[school system] exercised those rights to the detriment of the 
Petitioner’s [parent’s] case. 
The Petitioner [parent], in this case, had several claims 
that may have succeeded if presented in accordance with the 
laws, regulations, and policies. The Review Officer, however, 
does not and cannot decide for the Petitioner simply because 
Petitioner is a pro se parent. To favor a pro se parent when 
they are not following the required procedures would indicate 
bias in favor of the parent.136 
State Hearing Review Officer Walter’s candid assessment of the 
impact of proceeding pro se, along with research in other states concluding that 
it is “nearly impossible” for parents to prevail without an attorney,137 invites a 
comparison of outcomes in cases in which parents retain legal counsel to 
represent their interests and in which parents proceed pro se. 
As noted above, 97 written ALJ decisions issued in North Carolina 
from 2000 through 2012 form the basis for the analysis in this Article. In the 
136  Petitoner v. Cumberland Cty. Schs., 12 EDC 03259 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. July 19, 
2012) (State Review Officer decision). 
137  COLKER, supra note 24, at 151. 
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overwhelming majority (89.7%) of the 97 ALJ decisions reviewed, the ALJ 
stated plainly whether legal counsel appeared on behalf of any, all, or none of 
the parties to the proceeding. In ten of these decisions (10.3%), however, it was 
impossible to discern whether the parties were represented in the first-tier due-
process proceeding leading to the written ALJ decision.138 
Of the ten cases in which it was impossible to discern whether any 
party to the proceeding was represented, most were time barred or failed to 
state a claim properly. These procedural and pleading errors might suggest that 
the petitioners in those cases were pro se, but lawyers make these mistakes, too. 
This analysis thus treats as non-determinative all ten cases in which the ALJ 
decision did not clearly state whether a party was represented. All cases non-
determinative on representation status were excluded from the analysis of that 
factor. This means the total number of cases considered in this sub-section of 
the study is 87. 
Pro se petitioners account for just over half (54%) of the petitioners in 
first-tier due-process proceedings in which it is possible to discern from the 
written ALJ decision whether parties retained counsel. This 12-year study 
identified 45 written first-tier decisions with pro se petitioners. 
All (100%) of the pro se petitioners in these cases were parents of 
children with disabilities. None (0%) of the identified pro se petitioners in the 
period covered by this study were school systems.139 
Pro se respondents account for only 2.3% of the respondents in first-
tier due-process proceedings in which it was possible to discern from the 
written ALJ decision whether parties retained counsel.140 Again, all (100%) of 
138  See Student v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 00 EDC 0817 (State Review Officer 
decision) (missing ALJ decision required reliance on State Hearing Review Officer decision to 
discern what happened at the first-review, and although the parent was represented before the 
SRO, it remains unclear whether the parent was represented before the ALJ at the first-tier 
hearing); Student v. Caldwell Cty. Sch., No. 01 EDC 0083 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Mar. 
22, 2001) (same); see also Parent v. Buncombe Cty. Schs., No. 10 EDC 7420 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. Mar. 22, 2011); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 11 EDC 0938 
(N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 14, 2011); Student v. Union Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 10 EDC 
6732 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 4, 2011); Mother v. Buncombe Cty. Schs., No. 10 EDC 
6857 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 22, 2010); Student v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. 
of Educ., No. 10 EDC 2793 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Sept. 17, 2010); Student v. Buncombe 
Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 09 EDC 4879 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Sept. 8, 2009); Student v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 05 EDC 0731 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. July 18, 
2005); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 05 EDC 0700 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. July 18, 2005). 
139  Of course, it is possible that there was a pro se school-system petitioner among those in 
the ten cases in which it is impossible to determine whether the parties had counsel at the first-
tier hearing. This Article neither proves nor disproves that possibility. 
140  See Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Parent, No. 04 EDC 1131 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. 
Aug. 12, 2004); Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Father, No. 01 EDC 1802 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. Jan 2002). 
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the pro se respondents in these cases were parents of children with disabilities. 
None (0%) of the identified pro se respondents were school systems.141 
Given the frequency with which parents appear pro se in special-
education litigation, one might intuit that this approach frequently yields 
favorable results. It generally does not.142 
Pro se parents prevailed on all issues in only 1 of the 45 cases initiated 
and prosecuted by pro se parent petitioners.143 In other words, pro se parent 
petitioners who pressed their due-process complaints forward through a hearing 
to issuance of a written ALJ decision prevailed on their entire claim only 2.2% 
of the time. Notably, in the single case in which a pro se parent petitioner 
prevailed on all claims presented, the parent had assistance from a non-attorney 
advocate.144 As such, while this study included the parent as a pro se parent 
because she did not retain legal counsel, the prevailing parent did have some 
counsel and assistance. 
Pro se parents prevailed on at least one issue in 5 of the 45 cases 
initiated and prosecuted by pro se parent petitioners.145 In other words, pro se 
parent petitioners who pressed their due-process complaints forward through a 
hearing to issuance of a written ALJ decision prevailed on something, but not 
necessarily everything, presented in their complaint 11.1% of the time. Of 
course, one of the five cases in which a pro se parent prevailed on at least one 
issue is the same case counted above, in which the pro se parent prevailed on 
all issues with the assistance of a non-attorney advocate. Notably, of the 
remaining four cases in this group, two involved the same parent. 
Taken together, these facts about pro se parent petitioners produce a 
noteworthy data point. Over the 12-year period covered in this study, only four 
141  Again, of course, it is possible that there was a pro se, school-system respondent among 
those cases in which it is impossible to determine whether the parties had counsel. This Article 
neither proves nor disproves that possibility. 
142  See Weber, supra note 23, at 509 (recognizing after surveying the literature that although 
parents “do win” when they appear pro se, “the rate of winning goes up dramatically when 
[parents] have attorney representation”). 
143  Student v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 02 EDC 1461 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. 
Dec. 23, 2002). It is statistically significant (p = .0003), using a Chi-squared test in which p 
equals the likelihood that this would happen by chance, that parents prevail so infrequently on all 
issues in a case when they appear pro se. 
144  Id., slip op. at 1 (indicating that the parent enjoyed the assistance of a non-attorney 
advocate). 
145  Student v. T.D., No. 09 EDC 2329 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 2009); Student v. 
T.D., No. 09 EDC 2328 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 2009); Student v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1074 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Aug. 30, 2007); 
Student v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 02 EDC 1461 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 23, 
2002); Mr. C. v. Union Cty. Pub. Schs., No. 02 EDC 0622 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 
21, 2002). It is statistically significant (p = .00006), using a Chi-squared test in which p equals 
the likelihood that this would happen by chance, that parents so infrequently prevail on 
something, at least one issue, in a case when they appear pro se. 
2015] SPECIAL-EDUCATION LITIGATION 775 
parents have successfully resolved a claim or part of a claim without the 
assistance of an attorney at the first-tier impartial due-process procedure. 
Parents have also appeared unrepresented as respondents in two due-
process proceedings initiated by school systems. These pro se parent 
respondents lost in both instances.146 No pro se parent respondent prevailed 
during the period covered by this study. 
Of the 87 written ALJ decisions in which representation of the parties 
could be clearly established, parents appeared pro se, as noted above, in 47 
instances (45 times as a petitioner and twice as a respondent).147 Parents 
appeared through legal representation in 40 instances (39 times as a petitioner 
and once as a respondent).148 In other words, parents appeared unrepresented 
54% of the time and through legal counsel 46% of the time. 
Represented parent petitioners prevailed on all issues in their due-
process complaints in 12 of the 39 cases in which parents petitioned through an 
attorney.149 In other words, represented parent petitioners who pressed their 
due-process complaints forward through a hearing to issuance of a written ALJ 
decision prevailed on their entire claim 30.8% of the time.150 
Parent petitioners prevailed on at least one issue in 20 of the 39 cases 
in which they retained legal counsel to initiate and prosecute their due-process 
complaints. In other words, represented parent petitioners who pressed their 
146  See Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Parent, No. 04 EDC 1131 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. 
Aug. 12, 2004); Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Father, No. 01 EDC 1802 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 2002). Given the small sample size (3) of parent respondents, this loss rate 
does not show statistical significance using a Chi-squared test, and no inferences can be drawn 
from this result. Here, p = .08, and it must be less than .05 to indicate significance. Nonetheless, 
these results offer an accurate historical reflection of the outcomes in these cases. 
147  See Cabarrus Cty., No. 04 EDC 1131; Cumberland Cty., No. 01 EDC 1802. 
148  See Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Mr., No. 00 EDC 0465 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. 
Feb. 12, 2001). 
149  See Student v. Orange Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 08 EDC 2969 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. 
June 18, 2009); Student v. Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 2339 (N.C. Office of Admin. 
Hrgs. Aug. 29, 2008); Student v. Granville Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1605 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 29, 2007); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 06 EDC 1129 
(N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 7, 2007); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 
06 EDC 1284 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 2007); Student v. New Hanover Cty. Sch. Bd. of 
Educ., No. 06 EDC 0500 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Aug. 25, 2006); Father v. Randolph Cty. 
Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 05 EDC 1543 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Apr. 18, 2006); Parents v. 
Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 03 EDC 1637 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. June 
20, 2005); Father v. Randolph Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 1263 (N.C. Office of Admin. 
Hrgs. Aug. 16, 2002); Parent v. Johnston Cty. Schs., No. 02 EDC 0067 (N.C. Office of Admin. 
Hrgs. June 21, 2002); Ms. v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 0204 (N.C. Office of Admin. 
Hrgs. Feb. 27, 2002); Mr. L. v. Hickory Pub. Schs., No. 01 EDC 0878 (N.C. Office of Admin. 
Hrgs. Dec. 13, 2001). 
150  It is statistically significant (p = .0003), using a Chi-squared test in which p equals the 
likelihood that this would happen by chance, that parents would prevail so much more frequently 
on all issues in a case when they appear represented as compared to pro se. 
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due-process complaints forward with the assistance of legal counsel through a 
hearing to issuance of a written ALJ decision prevailed on something, although 
not necessarily everything, in their complaints 51.3% of the time.151 
Over the 12-year period covered in this study, only one written ALJ 
decision reflects a case with a represented parent respondent in a due-process 
proceeding initiated by a school system. The represented parent respondent 
prevailed in that case.152 
The following table reflects some of the data described above in this 
section. This format facilitates side-by-side comparisons of outcomes between 
cases where parents of children with disabilities appear pro se and cases where 
parents appear through legal counsel. The table illustrates each of the following 
pieces of data: (1) the number of due-process complaints filed and pursued 
through a full hearing by particular types of parents (pro se versus represented 
petitioners and respondents) from 2000 through 2012, (2) the percentage and 
number of complete “wins” involving each type of parent over the same period, 
and (3) the percentage and number of cases in which each type of parent 
prevailed on at least one issue in the written ALJ decision issued in the case.153 
151  It is worth emphasizing that this win rate for represented parents is statistically significant, 
exceeding the expected win rate, using a Chi-squared test (p = .00006). Considering similar data 
from another perspective, it is interesting to note that the represented parent petitioners lost their 
entire claims only 48.7% of the time, in 19 cases. 
152  Cumberland Cty., No. 00 EDC 0465 (illustrating a represented parent’s success as a 
respondent in overcoming a school system’s attempt to completely exclude a student with a 
disability as a dangerous student under a provision of the IDEA that has since been substantially 
revised). 
153  Some of the outcomes reflected in this chart were appealed to the second-tier 
administrative review before a State Hearing Review Officer. In those cases, the State Hearing 
Review Officer may (or may not) have reversed some of the ALJ outcomes during the second-
tier review. This Article does not contain data on the rate at which parents, pro se or represented, 
pursue second-tier administrative review or the outcomes of such appeals. 
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Type of 
Parent 
Percentage of claims in which this type 
of parent prevailed on all issues. 
Percentage of claims in which 
this type of parent prevailed on 
at least one issue. 
Pro se 
Petitioner 
n = 45 
2.2% 
n = 1* 
*This parent was not entirely pro se. She had
a non-attorney advocate representing her.
11.1% 
n = 5* 
*As acknowledged to the left, one 
of these parents was not entirely
pro se. And two of these cases 
involved the same parent.
Pro se 
Respondent 
n = 2 
0% 
n = 0 
0% 
n = 0 
Represented 
Petitioner 
n = 39 
30.8% 
n = 12 
51.3% 
n = 20 
Represented 
Respondent 
n = 1 
100% 
n = 1 
100% 
n = 1 
The Author emphasizes again that the cause of the outcomes reflected 
in the ALJ decisions included in the chart above cannot be determined from the 
information presented. There was no means by which the Author could 
determine, for example, whether parents achieve higher success rates with 
attorneys because attorneys take only the strongest cases, because they navigate 
the procedure better, or because of some other reason or combination of 
reasons. The Author notes, however, that in the District of Columbia where 
“legal counsel nearly always represent[s]” parent petitioners, the parental 
success rate is at 57%, similar to North Carolina’s 51.3% success rate in the 
group of cases in which legal counsel represented parents and in contrast to 
North Carolina’s 11.1% success rate for unrepresented parents. 
Ultimately, although the data in this study of North Carolina’s first-tier 
decisions correlates parents’ representation status with greater likelihood of 
parental success in first-tier special-education due-process proceedings, it does 
not demonstrate causation.154 
4. Age of the Child and the Type of Disability Do Not Correlate with
Particular Outcomes in Tier-One Decisions and/or Likelihood of
Representation, with Two Exceptions
Speculation abounds about whether parents of children with particular 
disabilities are more likely to litigate than others. Education observers have 
154  The Pearson’s correlation coefficient representing the strength of this relationship is r = 
.455. Pearson’s correlation coefficients between .3 and .5 are generally considered to be medium 
strength correlations. Anything at .5 or higher is considered to be a high strength correlation. 
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suggested, often based on intuition, that special-education litigation is more or 
less likely at certain ages or grades. In North Carolina, however, given the 
sample size in this research, these independent variables indicate no statistically 
significant impact on the likelihood that a parent will bring a due-process 
complaint, prevail through this process, or seek legal representation—with two 
exceptions. Parents of children with autism across various ages are more likely 
than other parents to secure legal representation for first-tier hearings in 
special-education disputes. And parents of pre-kindergarten children with 
autism persisted in special-education disputes through full hearing and written 
decision at a statistically significantly higher rate than parents of children with 
other disabilities.155 
Of the 97 cases considered, not all identified the child’s age or 
disability. When a claim was dismissed on procedural grounds, as beyond the 
statute of limitations, for example, ALJs had no reason to identify the child’s 
age or disability, and their decisions made no mention of them. Additionally, in 
some instances, the child’s age, grade, and/or disability were redacted to protect 
the confidentiality of the child. The total number of cases examined in which 
the child’s age or grade156 was identified was 76. The total number of cases in 
which the child’s disability was identified was 65. 
Out of the 76 cases that identified the child’s age or grade, 6 involved a 
child in the 2 years of pre-kindergarten (ages 3 and 4); 27 involved a child in 
the 6 years of elementary school (ages 5 through 10); 13 involved a child in the 
3 years of middle school (ages 11 through 13); and 30 involved a child in the 4 
years of high school (ages 14 through 18).157 
Although these totals appear at first blush to present a relative increase 
in fully litigated contested cases involving high school children with 
disabilities, given the small sample size, this difference is not statistically 
significant.158 The grade of the child with a disability at issue has no 
155  Causation cannot be determined from these numbers, and factors beyond the scope of this 
research may influence this outcome. Notably, three of the four parents of pre-kindergarten 
children with autism had legal counsel and the fourth parent was an attorney himself. 
156  Of the decisions in which a child’s age and/or grade are identified, some decisions identify 
only the child’s grade, others identify only the child’s age, and still others identify both. For 
purposes of this analysis, the Author used common age ranges for grades in North Carolina to 
establish grades for students whose grades were not identified. It then utilized grade to determine 
whether a particular grade or school type was more or less likely to appear in a contested due-
process proceeding litigated to full decision by an ALJ. 
157  Generally speaking, the ages identified in the text correspond with the grades specified. 
There are a few instances, of course, in which a child had been held back for a year or two, and 
his age exceeded the ages typically found in a particular group of grades. In these instances, the 
child was included in the grade grouping specified for the child, regardless of the child’s age. 
158  Overall, this sample included an average of 5.07 first-tier written decisions per grade. 
When broken down by grade, it included an average of only 3 first-tier written decisions per 
grade in the pre-school years, 4.5 first-tier written decisions per grade in elementary school, 4.3 
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statistically significant bearing on the likelihood that a parent will press a claim 
through a hearing to a written decision by an ALJ. 
Similarly, and as one would expect, the win/loss rates for parents at 
each grade level (pre-kindergarten, elementary, middle, and high school) are 
constant, with no statistically significant variance.159 In other words, parents are 
no more likely to win or lose should they bring a claim at a particular stage in 
their child’s education. 
The same is true with respect to the likelihood that parents will proceed 
pro se, without legal representation. Although more parents of high school 
students appeared pro se than did parents of students at other stages, this 
heightened ratio is not statistically significant applying Pearson’s Chi-squared 
test to compare this sample to the population at large.160 
In the group of 65 cases that identified the child’s disability or 
disabilities, 38 cases (58.5%) involved a child with multiple disabilities.161 In 
all of these cases, a wide variety of disabilities were identified. This group 
included, inter alia, anxiety disorder, Asperger’s Syndrome, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, autism, bipolar disorder, blindness, cerebral palsy, 
deafness, depression, developmental delay, diabetes, dyslexia, emotional 
disturbance, Fragile X Syndrome, obsessive-compulsive disorder, oppositional 
defiant disorder, quadriplegia, seizure disorder, and speech impairments.162 
Of the cases presented, two notable patterns emerge with respect to 
autism. First, in the six pre-kindergarten cases, involving children ages three 
and four, autism is identified as one of the child’s disabilities in four of the six 
cases. In other words, autism appeared in 66.6% of the pre-kindergarten 
decisions over this 12-year period. In contrast, autism only appeared in 10 of 
the 59 cases across other age groups; this means that from kindergarten through 
high school, autism appeared in only 16.9% of the decisions over this 12-year 
first-tier written decisions per grade in middle school, and a more substantial 7.5 first-tier written 
decisions per grade in high school. Nonetheless, this apparent increase in fully litigated cases in 
high school is not statistically significant (p = .07) using a Chi-squared test. 
159  The Chi-squared test produced a p-value of .90, indicating no significant difference from 
expected values across grade levels. 
160  The Chi-squared test produced a p-value of .52, indicating no significant difference from 
expected values across grade levels. 
161  Three additional cases asserted the child at issue had “multiple disabilities” without 
specifying those disabilities with any greater precision. See Student v. Buncombe Cty. Sch. Dist. 
Bd. of Educ., No. 08 EDC 2971 (N.C. Office of Admin Hrgs. Aug. 17, 2009); Student v. 
Hertford Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 09 EDC 2330 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. July 16, 2009); 
Student v. Granville Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1605 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 29, 
2007). These 3 cases were not included in the 65 with identified multiple disabilities. 
162  One interesting observation is that of the 65 cases in which disability was specified, 22 
included a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD), and most diagnoses of ADD or ADHD appeared co-morbid with other 
diagnoses. Only four cases in the sample studied involved a child with ADD or ADHD and no 
other co-diagnosis. 
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period. The disproportionate number of fully litigated cases involving autism in 
pre-kindergarten is a statistically significant anomaly, even taking into account 
the small sample size.163 
Second, parents of all children with autism were more likely than 
parents of children with any other disability to retain legal counsel for their 
first-tier special-education hearing. Of the 14 autism cases in this sample, 12 
(85.7%) had representation. In contrast, only 22 of the 49 cases (44.9%) in 
which representation status was clear in the written decision, in which disability 
was specified, and in which autism was not involved, had representation. This 
difference in the rate of representation in cases involving autism is statistically 
significant.164 
Recognizing that autism stands out as a disability with outlier results 
invites additional research here.165 This is particularly so because these parents 
have accessed legal representation, which correlates with greater success rates 
for families, at higher rates than parents of children with other disabilities.166 
More broadly, however, neither age nor disability of the child shows a 
statistically significant impact on outcomes or parental choices regarding 
representation in special-education due-process proceedings. 
B. Traditional School-System Data 
School systems initiate due-process proceedings in markedly fewer 
numbers than parents of children with disabilities. To keep these cases in 
context, this section begins with data demonstrating that most school systems 
over the 12-year period studied were not involved in hearings litigated through 
to a full, written decision at all, neither as a petitioner nor as a respondent.167 
163  Statistical significance using Pearson’s Chi-squared test demonstrates that this occurrence 
was unlikely to have been by chance (p = .0015). 
164  Statistical significance using Pearson’s Chi-squared test demonstrates that this occurrence 
was unlikely to have been by chance (p = .0018). 
165  Professor Colker noted in her research that parents of children with autism are more likely 
than parents of children with other disabilities to bring due process in Ohio, Florida, and 
California, but not in D.C. COLKER, supra note 24, at 148, 161, 211. 
166  Other scholars have examined access to representation and hearing success using parental 
wealth as a factor. See, e.g., Elisa Hyman, Dean Hill Rivkin & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, How 
IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special 
Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 156–59 (2011). Wealth 
information was not available to this Author, making it impossible for this Author to determine 
whether parental representation of parents of children with autism, or other disabilities, correlated 
with parental wealth. 
167  It is likewise true that most North Carolina parents of children with disabilities are not 
involved in due-process proceedings that extend through to full, written decision following a 
first-tier hearing before an ALJ. See supra Part IV.A (offering explanation of similar data on 
parents). 
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1. Most Traditional School Systems Are Not Involved in Due-Process
Proceedings
North Carolina’s cities and municipalities operate 115 school systems 
across the State. Of those 115 traditional public school systems, only 31 over 
the period studied were involved in special-education due-process proceedings 
that have gone to full hearing and required a written decision by an ALJ. This 
means that only 27% of North Carolina’s traditional public school systems 
have been involved in contested complaints—in this context—over the past 12 
years. Most traditional public school systems have avoided special-education 
disputes or resolved them prior to a full hearing culminating in a written 
decision by an ALJ. 
North Carolina maintains 2,613 traditional public schools.168 Of those 
schools, only 93 at most (excluding from the total number of cases considered 
in this study the 4 cases involving charter schools) have been involved in these 
contested special-education matters. This means that at most 3.5% of North 
Carolina’s traditional public schools have been involved in contested special-
education disputes that could not be resolved prior to a written decision by an 
ALJ. 
It is impossible, however, to determine which schools, in particular, 
have been involved in these cases. In most available ALJ decisions, the name 
of the school attended by the child with a disability was redacted as 
confidential student information. But even assuming that each case involving a 
traditional public school identifies a “new” school that was not a party to 
another due-process proceeding over the period studied,
169
 it is clear that the 
overwhelming majority of the State’s traditional public schools, at least 96.3% 
of them, were not involved in contested special-education disputes over the 12-
year period studied. 
2. School Systems Rarely Initiate Claims
School systems initiated the proceedings in only 3 out of 97 cases that 
persisted through issuance of a final ALJ decision. In other words, since 2000, 
school systems have initiated only 3.1% of all due-process matters that required 
a full hearing before resolution. And although parents have initiated due-
168  Derrick Meador, North Carolina Education, ABOUT EDUCATION, http://teaching.about.com/ 
od/ProfilesInEducation/a/North-Carolina-Education.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015). 
169  This is unlikely given that the decisions evaluated suggest by their particulars, in some 
instances, that the same parent and student are involved in multiple claims in a single year. But it 
cannot be conclusively established because the identities of the parent and child are redacted 
from these decisions as required by law. 
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process proceedings each year over the period studied, a school system has not 
initiated a fully tried due-process proceeding since 2004.170 
With a sample size this small, the data reflected cannot be understood 
to represent trends. Instead, it simply informs about the outcomes in this group 
of cases. With that caveat, this Article offers the following data. 
One initial noteworthy observation appears: although the set of due-
process complaints initiated by school systems from 2000 through 2012 is 
much smaller than the set of due-process complaints initiated by parents over 
the same period, the “win rate” is larger. 
School-system petitioners prevailed on all issues in their complaints 
66.7% of the time. Of the three due-process complaints initiated by school-
system petitioners, school-system petitioners prevailed in two. Both “winning” 
due-process complaints involved school-system efforts to evaluate a child to 
determine the child’s eligibility for special educational services over parents’ 
objections. Both “winning” due-process complaints involved pro se parent 
respondents.171 
A school-system petitioner has lost only once.172 In that case, the 
school system sought to establish that a child with a disability could be 
excluded from school as a danger to himself and others.173 The ALJ determined 
that the school system failed to meet its burden of proof and did not 
demonstrate that maintaining the child in his current educational placement was 
substantially likely to result in injury to the child or others.174 This school-
system complaint involved a represented parent respondent.175 
The following table reflects some of the data described above in this 
section. It illustrates, in a format intended to facilitate side-by-side comparisons 
of tier-one outcomes, each of the following pieces of data: (1) the number of 
due-process complaints filed and pursued through a full hearing by both parents 
of children with disabilities and schools systems from 2000 through 2012, (2) 
the number of cases in which the particular petitioner prevailed on all issues 
170  The only three instances in the data sample considered in this analysis in which a school 
system initiated a due-process proceeding occurred in 2000, 2001, and 2004. 
171  See supra Part IV.A.3 (offering an analysis of the statistical significance of the correlation 
between parental representation and favorable parental outcomes and demonstrating the 
increased likelihood of school-system success in claims brought by pro se parents). 
172  See Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Mr., No. 00 EDC 046 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. 
Feb. 12, 2001). 
173  Id., slip op. at 2. The federal authority relied upon to initiate this due-process complaint 
was repealed and replaced in the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. at 3. 
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over that same period,176 and (3) the percentage of cases in which each type of 
petitioner prevailed before an ALJ on all issues presented for hearing.177 
Type of Petitioner 
Percentage of cases pursued through issuance of a written ALJ 
decision from 2000 through 2012 in which this party prevailed 
on all claims presented in their complaint. 
Parent of a Child with 
a Disability (both pro 
se and represented) 
n = 94 
13.8% 
n = 13 
School System 
Educating a Child 
with a Disability 
n = 3 
66.7% 
n = 2 
As noted, the cause of the disparate outcomes reflected in the first-tier 
ALJ decisions considered here cannot be determined from the information 
presented. And the sample size in cases in which complaints were initiated by 
school systems is too small to extract outcome trends.178 
But other data points discernable from these records can be and have 
been explored. As noted above, of the factors considered in this study, the 
variable most highly correlated with particular outcomes is parental 
representation by counsel.179 Even this variable, however, cannot be identified 
as the cause of the disparate outcomes reflected here based on the study 
conducted. This research invites further exploration of causal influences on 
outcomes. 
176  This table reflects outcomes in cases in which petitioners prevailed on all issues identified 
in their due-process complaints because in a majority of cases, ALJs resolve all issues in favor of 
a single party. Of the first-tier final ALJ decisions considered in preparation of this Article, 
86.6% ended with a single party prevailing on all issues. In only a relatively small minority of 
cases (13.4%), the ALJ reached a split decision and determined that each party prevailed on 
portions of the complaint. 
177  Some of the outcomes reflected in this chart were appealed to the second-tier 
administrative review before a State Hearing Review Officer. In those cases, the State Hearing 
Review Officer may (or may not) have reversed some of the ALJ outcomes during the second-
tier review. 
178  When comparing “win” rates of school petitioners to parent petitioners, the schools’ 
higher win rate as petitioners is consistent with schools’ overall win rate and does not show 
statistical significance compared to parent petitioners’ win rates using Pearson’s Chi-squared 
measure (p = .55). This data is offered here only to show historically what has happened in these 
cases. 
179  See supra Part IV.A.3. 
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3. In this Sample, Urban School Systems Were Only Slightly More
Likely than Rural School Systems to Face Represented Parents in
Due Process, but the Difference Was Not Statistically Significant
Parents of children with disabilities in North Carolina’s urban and rural 
counties are almost equally involved in contested special-education disputes 
that press through first-tier hearings to written decision. For purposes of this 
analysis, a county was considered “urban” if it had a population over 250,000 
according to 2012 census data. By this measure, Mecklenburg (including 
Charlotte, North Carolina, and a population of 967,971), Wake (including 
Raleigh, North Carolina, and a population of 952,143), Guilford (including 
Greensboro, North Carolina, and a population of 501,018), Forsyth (including 
Winston Salem, North Carolina, and a population of 357,850), Cumberland 
(including Fayetteville, North Carolina and a population of 323,011), and 
Durham (including Durham, North Carolina, and a population of 282,081) 
counties are included in the “urban” group.180 
Of the 97 decisions in this 12-year study, 40 (41.2%) arose from claims 
filed in urban school systems and 57 (58.8%) arose in rural school systems. 
In urban systems, 19 out of 36 cases (52.8%) in which representation 
status was known involved parents with legal representation. In rural systems, 
21 out of 51 cases (41.2%) in which representation status is known involved 
parents with legal representation. Although school systems in urban 
communities were slightly more likely than school systems in rural 
communities to face represented parents in due process in the population of 
cases studied, this difference is not statistically significant given the sample 
size.181 
C. Charter School Data 
School-system petitioners prevailed in the first tier of administrative 
review in 66.7% of all special-education due-process cases they initiated. 
School-system respondents prevailed at the same level of review on at least one 
issue in 81 of the cases they defended, or 86.2% of the time. These are 
impressive winning percentages, and they inspire curiosity about whether all 
public school systems—charter and traditional—prevail at equal rates. 
This section offers background on charter schools’ obligations toward 
children with disabilities under the IDEA and North Carolina law, considers 
charter schools’ enrollment of children with disabilities, and provides charter 
180  See North Carolina Population by Count—Total Residents, U.S.PLACES.COM, http://www. 
us-places.com/North-Carolina/population-by-County.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015). 
181  The difference in representation status between urban and rural communities is not 
statistically significant using Pearson’s Chi-squared test (p = .377). 
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school special-education litigation outcome data derived from final ALJ 
decisions issued over the 12-year period covered in this study. 
The IDEA provides that children in charter schools are entitled to 
special-education services to the same extent as children in traditional public 
schools. IDEA’s regulations state plainly that “[c]hildren with disabilities who 
attend public charter schools and their parents retain all rights” under the 
Act.182 
The IDEA’s regulations distinguish between charter schools that stand 
alone as independent local educational agencies (LEAs) and charter schools 
that are part of a network of public schools within an overarching LEA.183 In 
North Carolina, charter schools operate as independent LEAs for purposes of 
the provision of special-education services to children with disabilities.184 As 
such, IDEA’s regulations require each North Carolina charter school to be 
individually “responsible for ensuring that the requirements of [the Act] are 
met.”185 
North Carolina’s charter school legislation further emphasized, during 
the period covered by this research, that a charter school “shall not discriminate 
against any student on the basis of . . . disability.”186 The State’s current 
legislation continues to provide that a charter school cannot, except as stated in 
the approved charter document, “limit admission to students on the basis of 
intellectual ability, measures of achievement or aptitude, athletic ability, [or] 
disability,” among other things.187 
Despite the clarity in the relevant law, “questions have been raised 
about whether charter schools are appropriately serving students with 
disabilities.”188 According to the Government Accounting Office, 
Charter schools [have historically] enrolled a lower percentage 
of students with disabilities than traditional public schools. . . . 
In school year 2009–2010, which was the most recent data 
available at the time of our review, approximately 11 percent 
182  34 C.F.R. § 300.209(a) (2015); see also id. § 300.2(b)(1)(ii) (stating that the provisions of 
the Act “[a]pply to all political subdivisions of the State that are involved in the education of 
children with disabilities, including . . . [l]ocal educational agencies [traditional public school 
systems] . . . and public charter schools” ). 
183  Id. § 300.209(b)–(d). 
184  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.3(11)(b) (2015). 
185  34 C.F.R. § 300.209(c). 
186  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29F(g)(5) (2013) (recodified and amended 2014). 
187  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-218.45(c) (2015) (as amended in the 2015 session, 2015 N.C. 
Sess. Laws ch, 248, § 3.(b), http://www.ncleg.net/enactedlegislation/sessionlaws/html/2015-
2016/sl2015-248.html). 
188  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHARTER SCHOOLS: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL ATTENTION
NEEDED TO PROTECT ACCESS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 2 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/600/591435.pdf. 
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of students enrolled in traditional public schools were students 
with disabilities compared to about 8 percent of students 
enrolled in charter schools.
189
 
This statistical disparity holds true in North Carolina, although North 
Carolina’s disparity is not as great as the national one. During the 2009–2010 
school year, the most recent year with available data, North Carolina’s 
traditional public schools enrolled 1% more students with disabilities than its 
charter schools.190 Notably, this measure does not take into account the nature 
of the disabilities in the children enrolled in each type of public school. It only 
takes into account the number of children with a disability of any kind. 
Observers of charter school impacts have raised concerns not only that 
charter schools enroll fewer children with disabilities than traditional public 
schools, but also that the educational outcomes for those children in charter 
schools are not as favorable as for the same children in traditional public 
schools. In North Carolina, though, researchers report mixed educational 
impacts resulting from charter education of children with disabilities. This 
research suggests that North Carolina’s charter schools generally (when 
compared to traditional public schools generally) offer some educational 
benefits and some drawbacks. 
According to Stanford University’s Center for Research on Educational 
Outcomes, North Carolina’s charter school students with disabilities performed 
better than traditional school students with disabilities on reading 
assessments191 but performed worse than traditional school students with 
disabilities on math assessments.192 
Although charter schools must ensure their students with disabilities 
receive the education to which they are entitled under the IDEA, and although 
mixed reviews exist regarding their success in doing that effectively, only four 
due-process complaints against North Carolina’s charter schools have resulted 
in issuance of a final ALJ decision over the twelve-year period subject to this 
analysis.193 The first charter school case to result in issuance of an ALJ decision 
arose in 2009, and there were two ALJ decisions issued that year. Then, two 
additional cases arose and were resolved in 2012. 
189  Id. 
190  Id. at 8; see also STANFORD UNIV. CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, NATIONAL
CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY 18, 39 (2013), http://credo.stanford.edu/documents/NCSS%202013% 
20Final%20Draft.pdf. 
191  STANFORD UNIV. CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, supra note 190, at 42. 
192  Id. at 43. 
193  See Student v. Union Acad. Charter Sch., No. 12 EDC 12388 (N.C. Office of Admin. 
Hrgs. Feb. 4, 2013); Student v. Union Acad. Charter Sch., No. 12 EDC 1501 (N.C. Office of 
Admin. Hrgs. May 25, 2012); Student v. T.D., No. 09 EDC 2329 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. 
Dec. 2009); Student v. T.D., No. 09 EDC 2328 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 2009). 
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Of the four ALJ decisions issued in due-process complaints against 
charter schools, the charter schools prevailed on at least one issue in 100% of 
the cases. The charter schools prevailed on all issues in 50% of the cases. 
Considering the four charter school cases in isolation, then, these 
schools appear to have fared comparably to traditional public schools194 in the 
first-tier administrative review in special-education litigation. In other words, 
no meaningful difference in litigation outcomes at the first-tier administrative 
review in special-education cases appears in the data considered. 
Notably, however, because the number of charter school decisions 
available for review is so small, the results produced through this analysis are 
not reliable to indicate trends. Instead, they may fairly be viewed only as 
reporting on outcomes in these specific instances rather than as a predictor of 
outcomes in charter school cases generally.195 
Equally notable, the cause of the limited number of fully litigated due-
process complaints against charter schools is beyond the scope of this research 
and cannot be determined from the information available here. 196 Likewise the 
cause of charter schools’ high success rate in special-education litigation at the 
first-tier administrative review cannot be determined from the data available 
here. 
V. CONCLUSION: WRAPPING UP AND LOOKING FORWARD 
With nearly 100 ALJ decisions in special-education cases catalogued 
and analyzed, this research is only the beginning. Much work remains to be 
done, but some strong data trends emerged early. 
Most strikingly, attorneys make a material difference. Outcomes 
overall are “better” for parties who have them. Also notably, the number of 
fully litigated cases increased in North Carolina over the period studied, even 
after the addition of new, free-to-the-parties alternative dispute resolution 
options. 
194  Charter schools actually fared slightly worse than traditional public schools. Charter 
schools won outright in only two of four cases (50%). Traditional public schools won outright in 
68 out of 93 cases (73.1%). But this difference was not statistically significant using Pearson’s 
Chi-squared measure (p = .08). 
195  See supra note 146 (noting that p = .08 on this data point). 
196  The sample of charter school decisions may be small for any number of reasons, some 
suggesting favorable things about the provision of special education in those schools and others 
suggesting unfavorable things about it. For example, it may be that there are few cases because 
parents and children are served consistently in accordance with the IDEA and state law or 
because charter schools respond promptly and effectively to correct errors when they arise. On 
the other hand, it may be that there are few cases because violations are so egregious that parents 
abandon charter schools entirely and return to traditional public schools without seeking relief or 
because charter schools settle cases promptly knowing their violations of the law are apparent 
and egregious. It is impossible to determine based on the sample presented. 
788 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118 
More fundamentally, of course, the IDEA and its state counterpart 
represent meaningful progress from the pre-legislation era in which parental 
participation in the educational process for their children with disabilities was 
criminalized. While parents may not prevail in most cases, particularly when 
they proceed pro se, their participation is encouraged and protected. Parents 
know that and exercise their rights, finding at least occasional success in the 
process. 
The broad and ongoing goal of this research remains to identify and 
communicate information that might assist all participants in the special-
education process—public school administrators, educators, resource 
personnel, and support staff, as well as parents and family members of children 
with disabilities (along with the attorneys for each)—in realizing the ideal 
expressed in the IDEA nearly 40 years ago: to accept “[d]isability [as] a natural 
part of the human experience [that] in no way diminishes the right of 
individuals to participate in or contribute to society” and to “[i]mprov[e] 
educational results for children with disabilities”197 so that they might secure an 
opportunity to do what they are “fitted to do.”198 
All involved in special education, in schools and in homes, in 
courtrooms and in offices, work hard every day to fulfill the law’s objectives. 
This research seeks and shares its data so that it might inform conversations 
about how to make this work easier, and less adversarial, for schools and 
families down the road. 
197  20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2013). 
198  See JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 308 (1944) (stating that “to find out what 
one is fitted to do and to secure an opportunity to do it is the key to happiness”). 
